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'The ultimate question in every employment discrimination case involving a
claim of disparate treatment is whether the plaintiff was the victim of intentional
discrimination."' This statement by the Supreme Court in Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Products' recites a basic and familiar principle of employment
discrimination law. A successful disparate treatment claim requires a finding of an
intent to discriminate.
But who must intend to discriminate? One could start with the obvious answer:
a statutory employer must possess the requisite intent. Federal employment
discrimination statutes, after all, hold only those who meet the statutory definitions of
employer, and not the world at large, responsible for employment discrimination.3
Employers, however, particularly those with the requisite number of employees,4
usually are corporate entities who, more often than not, are held vicariously, not
directly, liable for employment decisions made by supervisory employees.5 Is it, then,
the individual supervisor's intent that matters in disparate treatment cases? That
appears to be the accepted view; disparate treatment analysis generally proceeds from
the assumption that an individual supervisor has taken a challenged action and then
questions whether that supervisor acted with the requisite intent.6
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1. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2111 (2000).
2. 530 U.S. 133, 120 S. Ct. 2097 (2000).
3. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1994); Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,29 U.S.C. § 623(1999); Americans with Disabilities Act,
42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2000). The statutes also prohibit discrimination by labor organizations and
employment agencies, but the focus here, as is true in the vast bulk of the reported cases, is on
discrimination by employers.
4. Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act define employers to include those "with 15
or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or
preceding calendar year." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(bXl994); 42 U.S.C. § 1211 1(5)(A) (2000). The ADEA
covers employers with 20 or more employees. 29 U.S.C. § 630(bXl 999).
5. Vicarious liability imposes liability on an employer for the acts of its agents. See W. Page
Keeton et al, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts §§ 69-70, at 499-508 (5th ed. 1984). See
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998) (discussing the rationale for
imposing vicarious liability on employers in employment discrimination cases).
6. Martha S. West, Gender Bias in Academic Robes: The Law's Failure to Protect Women
Faculty, 67 Temp. L. Q. 67, 130 (1994) (noting Supreme Court's focus on single decision makers in
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But it is not at all unusual in many employment settings for a particular
employment decision to be made not by a single individual but by a number of
persons. Sometimes, employment decisions are made after a recommendation
works its way up the chain of authority; sometimes employment decisions are made
by a committee or other ad hoc group; and sometimes the decision making process
includes both.7
The facts in Reeves, for example, present a common scenario. Roger Reeves
supervised a production line in Sanderson Plumbing Products's Hinge Room.!
After complaints about attendance problems in Reeves's department were made, the
company's Director of Manufacturing, Powe Chestnut, ordered an audit.9
Following that audit, Chestnut, together with the Vice-President of Human
Resources, Dana Jester, and the Vice-President of Operations, Tom Whitaker,
recommended to the company's president, Sandra Sanderson, that Reeves be fired.'0
Sanderson, who not only was the president of the company but Chestnut's wife,"
accepted that recommendation and fired Reeves. 2 Thus, the decision making
process involved in Reeves' firing involved both a recommendation that went up
the chain of command (what we will refer to as vertical decision making) and a
recommendation that was itself the product of group action (what we will refer to
as horizontal decision-making). At least four people were involved, at one stage or
the other, in the decision to terminate Reeves' employment.
Only one of those persons, Powe Chestnut, was deemed to have harbored any
age-based animus. 3 Yet it was not Chestnut, but company president Sanderson,
who actually fired Reeves, and no evidence of any age-based motivation on her part
was presented.' 4 Indeed, the appeals court, in finding insufficient evidence of
intentional discrimination, noted that Sanderson was herself over fifty years old.'5
Sanderson Plumbing Products, however, was held liable for intentional
discrimination by the Supreme Court, even though the ultimate decision maker
employment discrimination cases).
7. Charles A. Sullivan,Accountingfor Price Waterhouse: Proving Disparate Treatment Under
Title VII, 56 Brook. L. Rev. 1107, 1138 (1991) ("In reality, many employment decisions involve
multiple decisionmakers, either in a collegial or a hierarchical structure."); West, supra note 6, at 130,
pointing out that faculty personnel decisions "are the result of a process where often no specific
individual's intent is either discernible or can be labeled as a 'motivating factor' causing the decision
to be made."
8. 530 U.S. 133, 137, 120 S. Ct. 2097,2103 (2000).
9. Id. at 143, 120 S. Ct. at 2106.
10. Id. at 144, 120 S. Ct. at 2107.
II. Id. at 152,120 S. Ct. at 2111.
12. Id. at 144, 120 S. Ct. at 2107.
13. Id. at 151, 120 S. Ct. at 2110. Chestnut was alleged to have told Reeves that he "was so old
[he] must have come over on the Mayflower," and that he "was too damn old to do his [job.]" The
statements, however, were not made in the context of Reeves' termination and thus were viewed as
circumstantial, not direct, evidence of discrimination.
14. Nor did plaintiff allege that the two other individuals (Jester and Whitaker) involved in the
recommendation that he be fired were motivated by his age. Id. at 139, 120 S. Ct. at 2104.
15. Id.
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presumably did not mean to fire, nor understood that she was firing Roger Reeves
because of his age.
Given the intent requirement, how could such a result have been reached?
There are at least two possible explanations. First, one could read the Reeves Court
as imposing liability because it believed that, whatever the formal structure used to
arrive at the termination decision, the person who in fact made the decision to fire
Reeves was Chestnut, the person with the age-based animus. Certainly there is
language in the Court's opinion to that effect. The Court pointed to .evidence that
Chestnut wielded "absolute power" in the company and "was principally.
responsible for [Reeves'] firing."'" The Court even referred to Chestnut as the
"actual decision maker," even though it was his wife who pulled the trigger. 7
Thus, it is possible to read the Reeves opinion as insisting on evidence that the
"actual decision maker" be the individual possessing the requisite intent.' 8 Itis also
possible, although more difficult, to read Reeves as holding that whenever anyone
in the decision-making process has expressed discriminatory animus toward the
plaintiff, that evidence will support employer liability when a prima facie case and
evidence undermining the articulated reason has been presented.' But Reeves, we
believe, is best read as not confronting directly the difficult question of how to
determine whether discriminatory intent is present in cases where multiple actors
are involved in the decision making process. By concluding that the individual
possessing unlawful animus was also the "actual decision maker," the Reeves Court
was able to sidestep this difficult question.
It is a question that has intrigued each of us for some time. How should courts
go about deciding whether intentional discrimination has occurred when an
employment decision is the result of either a vertical and/or a horizontal decision
making process? Answering this question ultimately depends on what the Court
means by "intentional discrimination."
There is language in some of the Court's decisions suggesting that an intent to
discriminate requires a conscious decision to act on the basis of, if not animus, at
least on the basis of an "inaccurate and stigmatizing stereotype."2 But reading the
16. Id. at151-52,120S. Ct. at2110-11
17. Id. In describing Chestnut as the "actual decisionmaker," the Court pointed to the fact that
he was married to the person who made the "formal decision" to fire Reeves. The thinly veiled
suggestion was that Sanderson was a mere figurehead, while her husband was essentially calling the
shots.
18. The Court does refer to Chestnut in this fashion at several places in the decision. Moreover,
in finding sufficient evidence to support the jury verdict in Reeves' favor, the Court coupled the
statements indicating Chestnut's age-based animus with evidence that Chestnut "was principally
responsible for petitioner's firing." Id. at 151, 120 S. Ct. at 2110.
19. It is difficult to assert that the Court so held because of the repeated references to evidence
of Chestnut's role as the "actual decision maker." However, the Court did hold that a prima facie case,
together with evidence that the proffered justification is false, may permit a fact finder to conclude that
the employer unlawfully discriminated. Statements reflecting animus by anyone involved in the
decision-making process, whether or not they were the "actual decision maker," would serve to
strengthen a plaintiff's case.
20. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 113 S. Ct. 1701, 1706 (1993).
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Court's decisions as a whole makes (or should make) abundantly clear that no
animus, ill will, prejudice or inaccurate stereotype need be at work." Rather, a
decision consciously premised on a protected characteristic is intentional
discrimination, even if benign business objectives, not prejudice, drive the
employer's race-based or sex-based decision. Intent, as various commentators have
correctly noted, is best understood not as animus but as a causation concept, one
that asks whether the plaintiff's race, sex, etc. caused the decision to occur.'
But must this use of race or sex by a decision maker be conscious for disparate
treatment to exist? In other words, must. the employer (or its agents) consciously
intend to take the protected characteristic into account in making the employment
decision at issue? Surprisingly, the Supreme Court has yet to confront this issue
head on.'
As a normative matter, let us be clear. We believe that Title VII should be
interpreted, and the Supreme Court's decisions can and shouldbe read, as rejecting
a requirement of conscious intent. 4 Instead, the intent requirement should simply
be viewed as mandating proof of causation. If an employee was treated differently
by his employer because of the protected characteristic, or, to put it another way,
if an employee's race or sex played a role in the employer's decision, then a
disparate treatment claim should exist."5
21. See infra notes 37-48 and accompanying text.
22. See Evan Tsen Lee & Ashutosh Bhagwat, The McClesky Puzzle: Remedying Prosecutorial
Discrimination Against Black Victims in Capital Sentencing, 1998 Sup. Ct. Rev. 145; Mary Ellen
Maatman, Choosing Words and Creating Worlds: The Supreme Court's Rhetoric and Its Constitutive
Effects on Employment Discrimination Law, 60 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1 (1998); Ann C. McGinley, IViva La
Evolucioni Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title VII, 9 Cornell J. Law & Pub. Pol., 415 (2000);
Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 Geo.
L. J. 279 (1997); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive BiasApproach
to Discrimination and Equal Opportunity, 47 Stan. L Rev. 1161, 1242-43 (1995); Larry G. Simon,
Racially Prejudicial Governmental Actions: A Motivation Theory of the Constitutional Ban Against
Racial Discrimination, 15 San Diego L. Rev. 1041, 1065 (1978); David A. Strauss, Discriminatory
Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 935 (1989); D. Don Welch, Removing
Discriminatory Barriers: Basing Disparate Treatment Analysis on Motive Rather Than Intent, 60 S.
Cal. L.Rev. 733 (1987).
23. Lee& Bhagwat, supra note 22, at 154 (Court "has never squarely considered the possibility"
that race may have caused a decision to occur without the governmental actor's conscious awareness
that it took race into account.).
24. Others hold a similar view. Lee & Bhagwat, supra note 22 (reaching similar conclusion in
equal protection context); McGinley, supra note 22; Selmi, supra note 22, at 288; Michael Selmi,
Discrimination as Accident: Old Whine, New Bottle, 74 Ind. L. J. 1233 (1999); Strauss, supra note 22;
Welch, supra note 22. But see Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317,324 (1987) (advocating a cultural meaning
approach to equal protection adjudications and observing that equal protection cases presently require
proof that defendant was consciously aware of his animus or consciously intended to discriminate);
Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 Ind. L. J. 1129 (1999) (acknowledging Court's decisions
may be construed to permit recovery for "unconscious discrimination" but contending that employers
should not be held liable for unconscious discrimination by their agents).
25. Krieger, supra note 22 at 1242-43 (advocating a causation-based approach and arguing that
it could be implemented without amending Title VII). Various other commentators claiming that intent
is a causation driven inquiry have argued that "unconscious" discrimination is presently actionable.
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But to articulate how the Court's disparate treatment decisions should be
interpreted is not to say that this is how lower courts are in fact interpreting or
applying them. It is the unusual case, to say the least, in which a supervisor's
unconscious bias has resulted in disparate treatment liability.26 Indeed, in
examining whether disparate treatment has occurred, lower courts continue to
search for conscious intent.
27
Framing.the disparate treatment inquiry as a search for conscious intent,
however, under-identifies instances in which an employee or applicant has been
denied employment opportunity because of his or her protected group status.
People are often not consciously aware of what in fact moves them to act.28
Accordingly, race, sex or age may have played a role in a decision without the
decision maker's active awareness that it was doing so. Rather than search for
evidence of a consciously held bias or motive, as too often occurs, a court should
focus the factual inquiry in a disparate treatment case on the question of causation.
All the facts and circumstances should be examined to determine whether the
protected characteristic played a causal role in the decision. In sum, the disparate
treatment inquiry should focus on causation, not conscious discrimination.29
Importantly, we find that thinking about discriminatory motivation in multiple
actor situations demonstrates why this must be so. In the vertical decision making
context, the question must not be whether the "actual decision maker" harbored
discriminatory animus, or even a conscious awareness that race, sex, etc. was
motivating the decision. The application of such a rule would require a finding
against the plaintiff in too many contexts in which even conscious, deliberate
discrimination by an agent of the employer, acting within the course and scope of
his employment, had caused the challenged action to be taken. Instead, as we will
show, and as various lower courts have recognized, the question should be whether
there exists an unbroken chain of causation between the employee's race and the
challenged decision.3"
With respect to horizontal decision making, where a decision emerges from a
group process, it makes little sense to search for a consciously held "collective
intent," except perhaps as a metaphor for some more complex set of phenomena.31
Groups do not "think," only individual people do. But an individual's membership
See Lee & Bhagwat, supra note 22; McGinley, supra note 22; Selmi, supra note 22; Strauss, supra note
22; Welch, supra note 22. Whether the protected characteristic need be the "but-for" cause or need only
have played a motivating role depends upon the statutory claim at issue. See infra notes 63-68 and
accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 69-85 and accompanying text.
28. A substantial body of empirical evidence supporting this claim is described in Krieger, supra
note 22, at 1213-16.
29. See sources cited supra notes 22-24.
30. See infra notes 97-136 and accompanying text.
31. See Lee & Bhagwat, supra note 22, at 154. ("The argument in favor of a purely causation
based approach to intent, powerful as it is when applied to individual governmental decisionmakers,
becomes overwhelming when the government conduct at issue is the product of collective
decisionmaking, as many discriminatory state policies are.").
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in a group may shape his or her judgment in ways quite significant to a
discrimination inquiry." Exploring the various ways in which discrimination can
occur when multiple agents play a role in the decision making process, and
examining the parallels between group and individual decision making, helps clarify
that the question of intent in employment discrimination cases must, at bottom, be
approached as a question of causation
Causation alone, however, is not enough. The action in which an employee's
race, sex, or other protected characteristic played a causal role must be attributable
to the employer. Vicarious liability principles determine when actions caused, at
least in part, by an employee's race, sex or other protected characteristic may be
attributed to an employer, and these principles must be applied in determining when
a disparate treatment claim involving multiple decision makers is actionable.
Importantly, consideration of vicarious liability theory helps refute arguments that
a causation-based approach to employment discrimination is an over-inclusive
method for remedying employment discrimination.
II. DISPARATE TREATMENT CLAIMS: THE INTENT REQUIREMENT
Disparate treatment, the Supreme Court tells us, is the "most easily understood
type of discrimination. The employer simply treats some people less favorably than
others because of their race, color, religion, sex or national origin. Proof of
discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in some situations be inferred from
the mere fact of differences in treatment."33 The existence of this discriminatory
motive is what distinguishes a disparate treatment claim from one involving
disparate impact, in which proof of a discriminatory motive is unnecessary.34 In
describing disparate treatment claims, the Court uses the terms discriminatory intent
and discriminatory motive interchangeably, as will we.3" In fact, however, motive
is the more accurate term, as it focuses on the reason for an act or why an act is
occurring, not on whether the employer intends to perform the act.36 Sanderson
Plumbing Products intended to fire Roger Reeves; on that point, there was no
dispute. Instead, the question was why the termination had occurred.
32. See infra notes 221-28 and accompanying text.
33. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 97 S. Ct.
1843, 1854-55 n.15 (1977).
34. Id. at 335-36,97 S. Ct. at 1854-55 n. 15 ("Claims of disparate treatment maybe distinguished
from claims that stress 'disparate impact.' The latter involve employment practices that are facially.
neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another
and cannot be justified by business necessity. Proof of discriminatory motive, we have held, is not
required under a disparate-impact theory.").
35. The Court's habit of equating the terms occurred in cases arising under the National Labor
Relations Act and has continued under Title VII and the ADEA. Since the Court uses the terms
interchangeably, commentators have as well. See Thomas G.S. Christensen & Andrea H. Svanoe,
Motive and Intent in the Commission of Unfair Labor Practices: The Supreme Court and the Fictive
Formality, 77 Yale L. J. 1269 (1968); Welch, supra note 22, at 763-64.
36. See Mark C. Weber, Beyond Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins: A New Approach to Mixed
Motive Discrimination, 68 N.C. L. Rev. 495,498 (1990); Welch, supra note 22, at 738.
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A. The Question of Hostile Animus
For years, it has (or should have) been clear that discriminatory intent or motive
is not coextensive with hostile animus." While an employer's hostility, hatred or
ill will toward plaintiffs race, sex, etc. will provide powerful evidence that the
protected factor motivated the employer's decision, such hostility, hatred or ill will
is not a required element of a disparate treatment claim. Instead, what must be
shown is that a plaintiffs race, sex, etc. motivated the decision, even if the
employer lacked any ill will.
For example, in Los Angeles Department of Water & Power v. Manhart,38 the
Supreme Court struck down a policy requiring women to make larger pension
contributions than men because women as a group live longer than men as a group.
The policy was facially discriminatory because "it does not pass the simple test of
whether the evidence shows treatment of a person in a manner which but for that
person's sex would be different."39 That the difference in treatment was based on
legitimate cost concerns, not hostile animus toward women, did not relieve the
employer of liability.
More recently, in International Union, UA W v. Johnson Controls, the Court
confmned that an intentional difference in treatment because of sex is all that is
needed for a disparate treatment claim. ° The Court rejected the employer's
argument that no disparate treatment claim should exist because it had excluded
women from numerous factory positions not out of animus but out of a concern for
fetal health.4 As the Court stated, "Johnson Controls's policy is not neutral because
it does not apply to the reproductive capacity of the company's male employees in
the same way as it applies to that of the females. Moreover, the absence of a
malevolent motive does not convert a facially discriminatory policy into a neutral
policy."42  The proper inquiry thus is not why the employer is treating women
differently from men but whether it is treating women differently than men.
In recent years, and despite the Court's holdings in Manhart and Johnson
Controls, the equation of discriminatory intent with hostile animus still powerfully
shapes the decisions of many lower courts.43 For example, the district court in
37. See Strauss, supra note 22, at 962-65.
38. 435 U.S. 702,98 S. Ct. 1370 (1978).
39. Id. at711,98S. Ct. 1377
40. 499 U.S. 187, 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
41. Id. at 199, 111 S. Ct. at 1203-04. This argument had been accepted by three circuits, despite
the facially discriminatory nature of fetal protection policies. See International Union, UAW v. Johnson
Controls, 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 499 U.S. 187, 111 S. Ct. 1198 (1991); Hayes v. Shelby
Mem'l Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543 (1 1th Cir. 1984); Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982).
42. 499 U.S. at 199, 111 S. Ct. at 1203-04. See also Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S.
542, 544, 91 S. Ct. 496 (1971) (employer's refusal to hire women with young children unlawful, even
though no hostility or animus toward women existed).
43. See McGinley, supra note 22, at 480 (noting escalation of this trend). See also Linda
Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika: Intergroup Bias After Affirmative Action, 86 Cal. L. Rev.
1251, 1311 (1998) (noting tendency to view discrimination as stemming from hostile animus).
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EEOC v. Joe's Stone Crab found no disparate treatment despite considerable
evidence that the restaurant had followed the "European" tradition of equating
"'fine dining ambience' with male food service."" Although this aspect of the
decision was criticized on appeal, with the Eleventh Circuit advising the trial court
that a finding of intentional discrimination does not require group animus, ill will
or malice toward women,45 that such clarification should be needed in 2000, thirty-
five years after Title VII's adoption, is cause for concern.
The 1991 amendments to Title VII underscore that hostile animus is not needed
for a disparate treatment claim. The statute was amended to clarify that "a
demonstration that an employment practice is required by business necessity may
not be used as a defense against a claim of intentional discrimination."4 While a
decision maker's animus may be powerful evidence of intentional discrimination,"
the absence of animus does not mean that intentional discrimination has not
occurred. When an employer has taken protected group status into account in
making an employment decision, intentional discrimination has occurred.48
B. Intent as Causation
At the same time, the Supreme Court also has made clear that an awareness that
a decision will adversely affect a protected group is not the functional equivalent
of an intent to discriminate. For intentional discrimination to exist, the employer
must act because of the protected characteristic, not in spite of it.49 Thus, in
PersonnelAdminstrator v. Feeney, the Court rejected an equal protection attack on
a veterans' preference law."° Although the law overwhelmingly advantaged men,
44. EEOC v. Joe's Stone Crab, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 727, 731-33 (S.D. Fla. 1997), vacated and
remanded, 220 F.3d 1263 (11 th Cir. 2000).
45. 220 F.3d at 1283-84 n. 19 ("[W]e believe the district court's conclusion that the EEOC has
not met its burden of proving intentional discrimination may have been based on an erroneous view of
Title VII case law .... We emphasize that a finding of disparate treatment requires no more than a
finding that women were intentionally treated differently by Joe's because of or on account of their
gender. To prove the discriminatory intent necessary for a disparate treatment or pattern or practice
claim, a plaintiff need not prove that a defendant harbored some special 'animus' or 'malice' towards
the protected group to which she belongs .... Several ambiguous phrases in the district court's
opinion suggest that the district court may have been operating under this erroneous view.").
46. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(2) (1994).
47. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S. Ct. 2097,2110 (2000).
48. Not all intentional discrimination by an employer, however, is unlawful. An employer that
intentionally discriminates may avoid liability if it can establish that sex, national origin, or religion is
a bona fide occupational qualification for the job at issue. There is no BFOQ for race. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(e)(1) (1994). The BFOQ affirmative defense is extremely narrow. See International Union
v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 202-04, 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1205-06 (1991) (rejecting BFOQ
defense in fetal protection case). Additionally, an employer may take race or sex into account in
making employment decisions when it does so under a lawful affirmative action plan. Such a use of
race or sex is not considered unlawful discrimination within the meaning of Title VII. Johnson v.
Transportation Agency of Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616, 107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987).
49. Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 278-79, 99 S. Ct. 2282, 2304-05 (1979).
50. Id. See Selmi, supra note 22, at 292, who reads Feeny as adopting causation as the standard
for intent; Lee & Bhagwat, supra note 22, at 152 (same).
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the Court found the Massachusetts legislature had not enacted or maintained the law
for the purpose of disadvantaging women but in spite of that adverse impact on
them. "Discriminatory purpose," the Court held, "implies more than intent as
volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker
... selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,'
not merely 'in spite of its adverse effects upon an identifiable group."'" Although
Feeney was a constitutional, not statutory, decision, the judicial approach to
intentional discrimination in Fourteenth Amendment claims and its approach to
intentional discrimination under Title VII has been consistent.
5 2
Feeney's invocation of the "because of' test corresponds to the statutory
language used in Title VII, the ADEA and the ADA. Each makes it prima facie
unlawful for an employer to take an employment action "because of' the protected
characteristic. 3 Accordingly, the Supreme Court's disparate treatment decisions,
properly construed, would view the motive or intent inquiry not as a search for
hostile animus or for adverse effects but as a search for causation.' Discrimination
is "because of' race, sex, age, etc. when the protected characteristic caused, in
whole or in part, the decision to occur.
The Court's various opinions in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins support this
view.5" Interestingly, each of the opinions in Price Waterhouse viewed the question
of unlawful motive as a causation inquiry. Indeed, the Price Waterhouse plurality
51. 442 U.S. at 279, 99 S. Ct. at 2305. While the obvious impact of an action on a protected
group may be powerful evidence that the defendant acted to achieve that impact, the impact is merely
evidence of unlawful motive, not the functional equivalent of it.
52. There are significant differences in the procedural aspects of such claims, but the substantive
aspects of purposeful discrimination appear to be the same. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S.
502, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993). See Harold S. Lewis, Jr., Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination
Law 342-43 (1997) (noting courts have considered that purposeful discrimination under equal
protection clause and Title VII to be equivalent and collecting cases). The Court, however, has rejected
the use of disparate impact theory under the equal protection clause. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229, S. Ct. 2040 (1976).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2000) ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer ... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions orprivileges of employment, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin"); 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2000) ("No
covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability
of such individual ...."); 29 U.S.C. §623 (a)(1) (1998) ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice
for an employer.., to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment
because of such individual's age.").
54. See sources cited supra note 22. As recently noted by Professor McGinley, the intent element
in employment discrimination cases is not a state of mind element as in tort law but instead "plays the
same role as but-for causation." McGinley, supra note 22, at 477-79. See also Rebecca Hanner White,
Modern Discrimination Theory and the National Labor Relations Act, 39 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 99,
140-44 (1997) (contrasting the causation based approach to intent under Title VII with the animus
based approach to intent under the NLRA).
55. 490 U.S. 228,109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989). Although agreeing thatPrice Waterhouse made clear
that intent is causation driven, Professor Maatman criticizes the Court for failing to define what
"because of" means. Maatman, supra note 22, at 2.
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and the dissent disagreed not over whether but-for causation was the critical
question, but rather, over which party bore the burden of proving it. The plurality,
joined by Justices White and O'Connor, believed that once the plaintiffproved that
her sex was a motivating factor (Justices White and O'Connor would say substantial
motivating factor) in the challenged decision, she would be entitled to a verdict in
her favor, unless her employer could prove that it would have made the same
decision anyway.' This approach essentially shifted to the defendant the burden
of proving that sex was not the but-for cause of its decision." The dissent would
have required the plaintiff to prove not only that sex was a motivating factor, but
also that it was the but-for cause of the challenged decision. 8
Similarly, in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, the Court, while rejecting the
notion that an employee who proves the nondiscriminatory reason proffered by his
employer is pretextual is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, confirmed that the
real question in disparate treatment cases is whether the decision was made because
of the plaintiff's race. 9 And in McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co.,'
the Court refused to permit employers to avoid liability on the basis of evidence of
wrongdoing discovered after the employment decision was made. The focus,
McKennon confirmed, is on the time the decision is made.6' Reasons unknown to
the employer at the time it acted could not have caused the act to occur and thus
could not eliminate liability. Most recently, in permitting same-sex sexual
harassment cases to proceed, the Court's decision in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services reaffirmed that the key issue in a sexual harassment case-or for that
matter, any other sex discrimination case-is whether the plaintiff has been
victimized because of his or her sex.62
Suggesting that the intent requirement should be understood as an inquiry into
causation is hardly a novel idea. Legal scholars have for some time argued that
intent to discriminate should be understood in this way.63 The degree of causation
required by employment discrimination statutes, however, is very much in dispute,
particularly after the 1991 Civil Rights Act's amendment to Title VII in response
to Price Waterhouse. Section 703(m) provides that "an unlawful employment
56. 490 U.S. at 244-45, 259, 262, 109 S. Ct. at 1791-92, 1806.
57. Although the plurality did not read the terms "because of' as requiring a showing of "but-for"
causation, but only that the protected characteristic be a motivating factor in the employment decision,
it did permit an employer to avoid liability by establishing it would have reached the same decision even
if it had not taken the protected characteristic into account. Id. at 240-41, 109 S. Ct. at 1797. This
effectively endorsed a but-for test of liability, as Justice Kennedy's dissent correctly noted. Id. at 281,
109 S. Ct. at 1828 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). See Sullivan, supra note 7, at 1.126 n.67.
58. Id. at 287, 109 S. Ct. at 1834 (Kennedy, J. dissenting).
59. 509 U.S. 502, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
60. 513 U.S. 352, 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995).
61. Id. at 359-60, 115 S. Ct. at 886.
62. 523 U.S. 75, 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998).
63. See Paul A. Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional
Motivation, 1971 Sup. Ct. Rev. 95, 115-24; Paul J. Gudel, Beyond Causation; The Interpretation of
Action and the Mixed Motives Problem in EmploymentDiscrimination Law, 70 Tex. L. Rev. 17 (1991);
Krieger, supra note 22, at 1242; Selmi, supra note 22, at 288-91.
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practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment
practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice." Professor
Michael Zimmer asserts, we think convincingly, that this amendment removes "but-
for" causation as an element of liability under Title VII, instead now requiring only
that race, sex, etc. be "a motivating factor."65 Causation is still required, but the
protected factor need not be the "but-for" cause of the challenged decision." Some
courts disagree, insisting that only in cases of "direct evidence" will Section 703(m)
apply, thus requiring the plaintiff to prove but-for causation in circumstantial
evidence cases.67 Moreover, the degree of causation required under other
employment statutes, such as the ADEA and Section 1981, and even under Title
VII's anti-retaliation provision, is uncertain." We need not engage this dispute
further here, but it is relevant to point out that the very existence of the debate
suggests that the motive inquiry in disparate treatment cases is, at base, a question
of causation, whatever quantum of causation is deemed necessary.
64. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000).
65. Michael J. Zimmer, The Emerging Uniform Structure ofDisparate Treatment Litigation, 30
Ga. L. Rev. 563, 600-09 (1996).
66. See Curley v. St. John's Univ., 19 F. Supp.2d 181, 189 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). Left to be
determined in cases in which Section 703(m) applies is what is meant by "a motivating factor." See
Gudel, supra note 63, at 39 (referring to a "motivating factor" as a "shadowy concept that lies
somewhere between 'but-for' and 'mere presence of a biased attitude."'). Will the protected
characteristic be a "motivating factor" only if it is a sufficient reason for a decision? Professor Michael
Wells advocates such a test for free speech cases in lieu of a "but-for" causation model. See Michael
Wells, Three Arguments Against Mt. Healthy: Tort Theory, Constitutional Torts, and Freedom of
Speech, 51 Mercer L. Rev. 583, 588-89 (2000). It has been contended that the legislative history and
the wording of Section 703(m) suggests the causal threshhold for a "motivating factor" is "extremely
low," with liability present whenever a nexus between the discrimination and a final employment
decision exists. Heather K. Gerken, Note, UnderstandingMixedMotives Claims Under the Civil Rights
Act of 1991: An Analysis of intentional Discrimination Claims Based on Sex-Stereotyped Interview
Questions, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 1824 (1993).
67. See, e.g., Fullerv. Phipps,67 F.3d 1137 (4thCir. 1995); Robert Belton,Mixed Motive Cases
in Employment Discrimination Law Revisited: A Brief Updated View of the Swamp, 51 Mercer L. Rev.
651,661-62 (2000) (describing conflict in the courts over whether Section 703(m) applies only in direct
evidence cases). This approach requires resolving the complicated issue of what constitutes "direct"
evidence. As Professor Belton notes, "[a]lthough the courts generally agree that plaintiffs must
introduce direct evidence of a 'motivating factor' under Section 703(m), they have about as many
definitions of 'direct evidence' as they do employment discrimination cases." Id. at 662. For an
interesting approach to the question of what is "direct evidence," see Wright v. Southland, 187 F.3d
1287 (11 th Cir. 1999) (J. Tjoflat).
68. Section 703(m) amends only Section 703 of Title VII and not Section 704, in which the anti-
retaliation provision is located. Thus, it has been held inapplicable to claims under Section 704. See
McNutt v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Illinois, 141 F.3d 706 (7th Cir. 1998); Woodson v. Scott Paper
Co., 109 F.3d 913 (3d Cir. 1997); Tanca v. Nordberg, 98 F.3d 680 (1st Cir. 1996). The ADEA and
Section 1981 were not amended in response to Price Waterhouse, and courts have continued to apply
Price Waterhouse to mixed motive cases arising under those statutes. See, e.g., Lewis v. YMCA, 208
F.3d 1303 (! Ith Cir. 2000); Harris v. Shelby County.Bd. of Educ., 99 F.3d 1078 (11 th Cir. 1996).
But see Curley v. St. John's Univ., 19 F. Supp.2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (applying Section 703(m) to an
ADEA claim).
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
C. Unconscious Intent
Less certain, however, is whether to satisfy the intent requirement, the decision
maker must be consciously aware that he is making a decision, at least in part,
because of the plaintiffs group status.69 Unconscious intent seems oxymoronic.
Numerous lower courts equate intentional discrimination with a conscious decision
to take action based on a target person's or persons' membership in a particular
social group.'0 Moreover, various commenters, while disagreeing with the
proposition that the Constitution or civil rights statutes such as Title VII should be
interpreted as requiring proof of conscious intent to discriminate, suggest that this
is, in fact, how such laws are generally construed in federal civil rights cases."
Indeed, there is language in some Supreme Court opinions that supports this
view. For example, in her plurality opinion in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust,
Justice O'Connor described disparate treatment claims as involving the application
of a "deliberately discriminatory motive" and appeared to view the "problem of
subconscious stereotypes and prejudices" as outside the reach of disparate treatment
claims.72 In Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, Justice O'Connor, this time in an opinion
for the Court, described disparate treatment in terms that could be interpreted as
requiring that some form of prejudice must be consciously operating.73 "It is the
very essence of age discrimination for an older employee to be fired because the
69. As Professors Lee and Bhagwat explain, although the Court's decision in Personnel
Administrator v. Feeney establishes that a conscious awareness of harm is not the equivalent of intent,
"Feeney does not exclude the possibility that conscious awareness may be a necessary element of
intent." Lee & Bhagwat, supra note 22, at 152.
70. See infra discussion in text accompanying notes 77-79.
71. See e.g., Lawrence, supra note 24, at 304 (observing that disparate treatment doctrine
requires proof of conscious awareness of animus); West, supra note 6, at 70 (noting that "only
conscious and demonstrable bias is subject to legal sanction"); Krieger, supra note 22 (describing and
criticizing courts' interpretation of Title VII as requiring proof of conscious intent to discriminate);
McGinley, supra note 22, at 480 (observing that courts are focusing on whether a conscious and often
invidious motive was present, despite psychological research demonstrating that intergroup bias is often
unconscious).
72. 487 U.S. 977,990, 108 S. Ct. 2777,2790 (1988) (O'Connor J., concurring) ("[E]ven if one
assumed that any such discrimination can be adequately policed through disparate treatment analysis,
the problem of subconscious stereotypes and prejudices would remain."). Some lower courts have used
this language to support their conclusion that subconscious forms of bias, if they are to be remedied at
all, must be addressed through the application of disparate impact theory, not disparate treatment
theory. See. e.g., Sperling v. Hoffman-LaRoche, 924 F. Supp. 1346, 1361-62 (D.N.J. 1996) (stating
that "unlike disparate treatment analysis . . . disparate impact analysis addresses the effects of
unconscious discrimination in addition to conscious or intentional discrimination."); See also Jackson
v. Harvard Univ., 721 F. Supp. 1397, 1433 (D. Mass. 1989) (stating that disparate treatment analysis
was never designed to police "subconscious stereotypes and prejudices").
73. 507 U.S. 604, 113 S. Ct. 1701 (1993). See Maatman, supra note 22, at 33, who reads
Biggins as confining the Court's "vision of discrimination to actions consciously based on inaccurate
beliefs about the employee's race, sex, religion, color, national origin, or age." She criticizes the
Court's "blame-based rhetoric" as excluding "unconsciously stigmatizing beliefs" from liability. Id.
at 63.
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employer believes that productivity and competence decline with age," she stated.
Reliance by employers on "inaccurate and denigrating generalizations about age,"
said the Court, was what Congress intended to prevent.7 4 Even the plurality's
decision in Price Waterhouse described the motive inquiry in the following terms:
In saying that gender played a motivating part in an employment decision,
we mean that, if we asked the employer at the moment of the decision
what its reasons were and if we received a truthful response, one of those
reasons would be that the applicant or employee was a woman."
That statement appears to suppose an awareness on the employer's part that it is
taking sex into account in its decision-making process.7'
Indeed, there exist surprisingly few published Title VII disparate treatment
decisions in which, after acknowledging the existence of unconscious bias, a court
has ruled in favor of the plaintiff or reversed a trial court ruling for the defendant
on that basis. 7' This situation persists, even following the Supreme Court's decision
in Price Waterhouse, 7 and is accompanied by a slow but discernable accretion of
74. Maatman, supra note 22, at 30. However the Biggins opinion also described the intent
inquiry in terms that were overtly causation based. See infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
75. 490 U.S. 228,250, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1797 (1989). As Professor Gudel notes, this definition
"assumes that the sine qua non of Title VII liabilitiy is a conscious intent to discriminate." Gudel, supra
note 63, at 62.
76. See Krieger, supra note 22 (suggesting that this language from Price Waterhouse reflects and
reinforces a fallacious notion that employment decision makers have ready access to the reasons why
they have made, or are about to make, a particular decision); But see McGinley, supra note 22, at 475
(asserting that the Price Waterhouse plurality "unwittingly expands the definition of intent to include
the use of unconsciously or consciously held stereotypes to make employment decisions.").
77. To our knowledge, there exists only one Title VII race discrimination case holding to this
effect. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Inland Marine, 729 F.2d 1229, 1236 (9th Cir. 1984)
(holding that disparate treatment discrimination occurs where decision maker applies subjective
employment criteria embodying racially discriminatory attitudes, even absent a conscious intent to
discriminate), cert. denied sub nom. Inland Marine Indus. v. Houston, 469 U.S. 855, 105 S. Ct. 180
(1984). One can find a somewhat larger number of sex discrimination cases resolved in plaintiffs' favor
on these grounds, including the decision of the D.C. Circuit in Price Waterhouse. See, e.g., Hopkins
v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 469 (D. C. Cir. 1987) (stating that unawareness of bias "neither
alters the fact of its existence nor excuses it"), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989). See also Lynn v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 656
F.2d. 1337, 1343 (9th Cir. 1981) (asserting that "disdain for women's issues ... is evidence of a
discriminatory attitude towards women"); Sweeny v. Board of Trustees of Keene State College, 604
F.2d 106, 113 n.12 (1st Cir. 1979) (sex discrimination case affirming judgment for plaintiff because
the district court reasonably concluded that the decision not to promote plaintiff was based on "a subtle,
if unexpressed, bias against women"). If dissents are taken into account, one more case can be added
to the tally. See Namenwirth v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 769 F.2d 1235, 1250-51(7th
Cir. 1985) (Swygert, J., dissenting) (stating "[s]ex bias need not be conscious to be actionable. The
most likely explanation for the events at bar is that [plaintiff] was scrutinized by the Department
because she was breaking new ground .... In short, given [plaintifrs] unhappy role as a pathbreaker,
she had to perform better than a male to succeed. Such unequal treatment-however unconscious or
subtle-violated Title VII.").
78. We have been able to find only one post-Price Waterhouse disparate treatment case that
acknowledged that the unconscious application of cognitive stereotypes may result in discrimination
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circuit court decisions remanding "subtle bias" dispositions in plaintiffs' favor to
the district court for "clarification" on the issue of conscious discriminatory intent. 9
The relative dearth of supporting case law provides Title VII plaintiffs and their
counsel with powerful incentive against premising a disparate treatment case on the
application of subtle or unconscious forms of intergroup bias. This results, we
suggest, in a growing disjunction between the way in which intergroup bias is
understood in the social sciences, or by members of minority groups who have
experienced it, and the way it is described in disparate treatment case law and
modeled in disparate treatment doctrine.
Curiously, one finds in cases under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act' a clear and longstanding judicial recognition that age discrimination can result
from the operation of subtle, unconscious mental processes and that, for this reason,
the critical inquiry in an age-based disparate treatment case centers on the question
of causation, not the question of conscious intentionality. As the Supreme Court
has held, to prove first-tier liability under the ADEA,5 ' a plaintiff need only prove
that her age "played a role in the decision" and "had a determinative influence on
and then, on this basis, ruled for the plaintiff. Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38 (1st Cir.
1999).
79. For example, in EEOC v. Cherry-Burrell Corp., 35 F.3d 356,363 (8th Cir. 1994), the circuit
court reviewed a district court decision finding in favor of a Title VII sex discrimination plaintiff on the
grounds that the alleged compensation discrimination resulted from subconscious bias. Noting that
Title VII "requires a finding of intentional misconduct, not subconscious unlawful action," the Court
of Appeals remanded the case to the district court for "clarification" on the question of intent to
discriminate. The court's thinly veiled directive to the district court was plain: if you want this decision
to stand on appeal, go back and find conscious intent to discriminate.
Similarly, in a recent race discrimination case, Ferrill v. Parker Group, Inc., 168 F.3d 468 (11 th Cir.
1999), the circuit court conceded that, to prove discriminatory intent, a disparate treatment plaintiff
need not show that the defendant harbored some special malice or hostility toward the group to which
plaintiff belonged. However, the court stressed that to prevail on remand, the plaintiff would have to
prove that the defendant "consciously and intentionally made job assignments based on racial
stereotypes." 168 F.3d at 473 n.7 (emphasis added).
A similar understanding of actionably discriminatory stereotyping as a conscious rather than
subconscious process is displayed in E.E.O.C. v. Joe's Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir.
2000). As earlier described, the circuit court premised its decision to remand the case for further
findings on the issue of discriminatory intent on the observation that, in hiring food servers, defendant
had apparently applied the stereotyped notion that "classy" restaurants employ male waiters, not female
waitresses. In providing guidance to the district court, the circuit court was careful to characterize such
stereotyping as a conscious process. Specifically, Judge Marcus explained that, "if Joe's deliberately
and systematically excluded women from food server positions based on a sexual stereotype which
simply associated 'fine dining ambience' with all-male food service, it then could be found liable under
Title VII for intentional discrimination .... 220 F.3d at 1284 (emphasis added).
80. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1988).
81. The A.D.E.A. establishes two tiers of liability. Under the first tier, an employer can be held
liable for damages for a simple violation of the Act, which makes it unlawful for an employer "to fail
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or other discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age."
29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1988). Under the second tier, an employer can be held liable for liquidated, or
double damages, if it committed a "willful" violation. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988).
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the outcome." 2 Many lower courts applying this standard have made clear that it
requires a causal inquiry, not an inquiry into the decision maker's conscious mental
state. In Burlew v. Eaton Corp.,' for example, the Seventh Circuit carefully
distinguished between motive, which the court defined as a causal construct, and
conscious intent to discriminate. Stated the Burlew court:
This standard-that age was a determining factor-does not in itself
require a finding as to defendant's state of mind, for in law there is a
distinction between motive and intent. "Motive is what prompts a person
to act, or fail to act. Intent refers only to the state of mind with which the
act is done or omitted." Indeed, in 1981, we stated:
Congress, in our opinion, intended that liability under the ADEA
could be established without any showing as to the defendant's state of
mind8
4
Along these lines, numerous circuit courts have acknowledged that "age
discrimination may simply arise from an unconscious application or stereotyped
notions of ability rather than from a deliberate desire to remove older employees
from the workforce" and on that basis have ruled in the plaintiff's favor.8 5
As these decisions recognize, requiring proof of conscious intent to
discriminate would lead to the significant under-identification of cases inzwhich
protected group status has "played a role in the decision" and has had "a
determinative influence on the outcome." This standard is, on its face,
unambiguously causal in focus. " If a plaintiffs race or sex caused an employment
action to occur, then liability should be present, even if the decision maker was
unaware that he was taking the prohibited factor into account. That "unconscious"
discrimination frequently occurs is well documented; many people are unaware that
race or sex has influenced their assessment of an individual.8 7 Most of us like to
82. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 113 S. Ct. 1701 (1993).
83. 869 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1989).
84. Id. at 1066 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 727 (5th ed. 1979)).
85. Spyvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149, 155 (7th Cir. 1981) (quoting 113
Cong. Rec. 34,742 (1967) (remarks of Rep. Burke)). Accord Brooks v. Woodline Motor Freight, 852
F.2d 1061, 1064 (8th Cir. 1988) (citing Spyvock for the proposition that unconscious stereotypes often
cause race discrimination); Oxman v. WLS-TV, 846 F.2d 448, 453 (7th Cir. 1988) (same); La
Montagne v. American Convenience Prods., Inc., 750 F.2d 1405, 1410 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating that
"[a]ge discrimination may be subtle and even unconscious."); McCormistin v. United States Steel
Corp., 621 F.2d 749,754(5th Cir. 1980) (stressing the subtlety of age discrimination). Various recent
applications of this principle can be found as well. See e.g., Oberg v. Allied Van Lines, No. 91-C-
6576, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4717 (N.D. II. 1996) (stating that age discrimination may result from the
unconscious application of stereotypes); See also In e Interco, Inc., 211 BR 667, 680 (1997) (age
discrimination case adjudicated in federal bankruptcy court finding in plaintiff's favor and observing
that "age discrimination is often subtle and may arise from an unconscious application of stereotyped
notions of ability.").
86. See supra discussion in text accompanying notes 81-85.
87. Krieger, supra note 22. See also McGinely, supra note 22; Tracy Ambinder Baron,
Comment, Keeping Women Out ofthe Executive Suite: The Court 's Failure to Apply Title VII Scrutiny
to Upper-Level Jobs, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 267 (1994) (asserting that discrimination against women in
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think of ourselves as unbiased persons free from the influence of prejudices or
stereotypes, but the reality is that few, if any, of us are."8 A causation-driven inquiry
would not focus on whether the decision maker was aware that he was basing his
decision on race, but on whether the plaintiff's race in fact caused the decision to be
made, in whole or in part. 9
The "reversing the groups" test, initially identified by Professor Strauss and later
endorsed by Professor Selmi, provides a useful way of thinking about causation.'
Professor Strauss asks, "Would the same decision at issue have been made were the
plaintiff white?" If not, then intentional discrimination has been established.9' In the
sex discrimination context, the plaintiff must show that she would have been treated
differently if she had been a man. If this showing is made, it follows that her sex
caused the action to occur.
This test is apt where the plaintiff must prove "but-for" causation. However,
when race, sex, color, national origin or religion need only be a "motivating factor,"
and not the "but-for" cause of a decision,' Professor Strauss's test is too narrow. In
cases where Section 703(m) applies, a causal nexus short of but-for causation will
suffice.93
But how can the requisite degree of causation be shown when the use of race or
sex was unconscious? Frankly, the same way it is shown when the use of race or sex
is consciously used as a factor but untruthiflly denied by the employer and its agents."
upper-level positions is "often unintentional and unconscious.").
88. Krieger, supra note 22. See also Linda Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika:
Intergroup Relations After Affirmative Action, supra note 43, at 1281 (discussing processes of
stereotype acquisition in early childhood).
89. Welch, supra note 22, at 778. As described by Professor Selmi:
What the Court means by intent is that an individual or group was treated differently
because of race. Accordingly, a better approach is to concentrate on the factual question of
differential treatment. In this way, the key question is whether race made a difference in the
decisionmaking process, a question that targets causation, rather than subjective mental
states.
Selmi, supra note 22, at 289. Moreover, as Professors Lee & Bhagwat have explained, in discussing
the meaning of intent in equal protection cases, if a plaintiff can prove an action was "because of" his
race, "to ask the plaintiff to further prove that the state actor was consciously aware of this factor
imposes an almost insurmountable burden of proof (except in the rare instance where the decisionmaker
admits the awareness). It also is not clear what policies would be advanced by such a requirement."
Lee & Bhagwat, supra note 22, at 154.
90. Strauss, supra note 22, at 960; Selmi, supra note 22, at 291.
91. Strauss, supra note 22, at 939. ("A court applying the discriminatory intent standard should
ask: suppose the adverse effects of the challenged government decision fell on whites instead of blacks,
or on men instead of women. Would the decision have been different? If the answer is yes, then the
decision was made with discriminatory intent." This test, as Professor Strauss notes, reaches both
conscious and unconscious discrimination. Id. at 956, 960.
92. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
94. See Krieger, supra note 22, at 1241-42 (suggesting that, under a causation approach to
disparate treatment proof, the same evidence used to prove covert intentional discrimination would be
used to prove cognitive bias, the primary difference between the two regimes being the inferences drawn
from particular facts); Selmi, supra note 22 (recognizing that the Court's proof structure in
circumstantial evidence should support a disparate treatment claim in cases involving "subtle or
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The evidentiary structure developed in circumstantial evidence cases, as most recently
confirmed in Reeves, is designed to allow a fact finder to determine whether race, sex,
etc. in fact played a role, perhaps a determinative role, in an employment decision
when the employer has denied taking the factor into account.S The evidence
underlying the prima facie case, the strength or weakness of the reason articulated by
the employer, evidence that the articulated reason is untrue and/or did not truly
motivate, differences in the treatment of others similarly situated to the plaintiff, and
past treatment ofthe plaintiff, and expressions ofanimus or bias by the decision maker
are all useful in determining whether the protected characteristic motivated a
decision.' What differs is not the nature of the evidence proffered to prove that
discrimination did or did not occur. Rather, what differs is the range of inferences that
a court is able to draw, or to instruct a jury to draw, from that evidence.
This follows because a causation approach to discrimination incorporates a
broader and more complete positive account of intergroup bias. It recognizes that
many types of bias, often operating outside of conscious awareness, can distort an
employer's judgment and cause him or her to discriminate based on an applicant or
employee's protected group status. Because the causation approach is based on a
more complete descriptive theory of intergroup bias, it provides a better-elaborated
"inferential architecture" for the structure of disparate treatment adjudication.
Thinking about intentional discrimination in the context of vertical or horizontal
decision making powerfully illustrates the normative superiority of the causation
approach to disparate treatment proof. As we will demonstrate, in the context of both
vertical and horizontal multi-agent decision making, a causation-based analysis is not
only the most sensible way of thinking about discriminatory motivation, it is the only
sensible way of approaching the issue.
I. VERTICAL DECISION MAKING
Disparate treatment claims in which the supervisory employee who acted for a
wrongful purpose is not the person who actually terminates the plaintiff are common.
Employer liability in such cases should depend on the answers to two questions: first,
whether there was a causal link between the protected characteristic and the challenged
decision; and second, whether in light of the chain of causation, the wrongfully
motivated action is attributable to the employer, either directly or vicariously.
A. The Causation Inquiry
The easiest cases, and those shedding little light on the issue of unconscious
discrimination or of how best to solve the multiple actor puzzle, are those in which a
supervisor motivated by invidious animus was the de facto decision maker, even
unintentional discrimination."); McGinley, supra note 22, at 447 (asserting that current disparate
treatment proof methods "are all capable of holding liable employers who have discriminated
unconsciously as well as those who have done so consciously.").
95. McGinley, supra note 22, at 484-85.
96. Id.
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though someone higher in the organizational hierarchy actually fired the plaintiff.
The firing decision in these cases is simply a rubber stamp. Courts have properly
refused to allow defendants to escape liability simply because the individual who
executed the termination decision had no intent to discriminate if the actual decision
maker acted unlawfully. When the formal decision maker is essentially "the cat's
paw"' 7 of a discriminating supervisor, for example, the supervisor's unlawfully
motivated recommendation should be a sufficient basis for imposing liability on the
employer for the termination."
Reeves exemplifies cases of this type. Although Sanderson, not Chestnut, fired
Reeves, the "actual decision maker," according to the Court, was Chestnut.
99
Therefore, his age-based recommendation to fire Reeves was the functional
equivalent of an age-based termination. Sanderson merely executed the decision
Chestnut had made, and thus, once the Court was convinced that there was
sufficient evidence that age motivated Chestnut's decision, imposing liability on the
company followed as a matter of course.
Other scenarios are more difficult. Suppose a supervisor recommends a job
action, such as termination, because of an employee's race or sex. But suppose
further that the ultimate decision maker does not simply rubber stamp the
recommendation but does take the impermissibly motivated recommendation into
account in reviewing the facts and making the final decision.
If the ultimate decision maker is aware that the recommendation was
improperly motivated, then imposing liability on the employer readily follows. That
essentially was the situation operating in Price- Waterhouse; some partners had
made recommendations against Ann Hopkins that were overtly biased."° The
firm's decision to accept those recommendations as part of the decison making
process was enough to find that Hopkins's sex was a motivating factor in the
decision to deny her partnership. 101
Lower courts have followed the Supreme Court's lead. For example, in
Barbano v. Madison County, statements by one hiring committee member that he
would not consider "some woman" for the job was enough to impute liability to the
Board, when the Board's "hiring decision was made in reliance upon a
discriminatory recommendation."' 2 The court rejected the argument that the
97. "Other circuits have recognized that a defendant may be held liable if the manager who
discharged the plaintiff merely acted as a rubber stamp, or the 'cat's paw,' for a subordinate employee's
prejudice, even if the manager lacked the discriminatory intent." Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Serv.,
Inc., 220 F.3d 1220,1231 (10th Cir. 2000) (collecting cases and agreeing with analysis); Willis v.
Marion County Auditor's Office, 118 F.3d 542 (7th Cir. 1997).
98. Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Serv., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220,1231 (10th Cir. 2000); Willis v.
Marion County Auditor's Office, 118 F.3d 542 (7th Cir. 1997).
99. 530 U.S. 133, 120 S. Ct. 2097 (2000).
100. 490 U.S. 228, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989).
101. Id. See also Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 105 S. Ct. 1504 (1985)
(discriminatory statements and actions by some committee members during hiring process supported
finding of sex discrimination by city).
102. 922 F.2d 139, 143 (2d Cir. 1990). The Barbano court expressly relied upon Price
Waterhouse in reaching this result.
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Board's decision itself was not tainted, as it made no effort to distance itself from
the discriminatory statements.'0 3 And more recently in Hunt v. City of Markham,
statements by a black mayor that the "city needed to get rid of all the old white
police officers" were admitted to prove that the city council's decision was
discriminatory. " Even though the mayor had no vote, he made recommendations
to the city council on the decision at issue. "Emanating from a source that
influenced the personnel action (or nonaction), the derogatory comments are
evidence of discrimination. ' '
Often, however, a tainted recommendation will be facially neutral, and the
ultimate decision maker will be unaware that it was based on the employee's
protected status. Will employer liability be found in those circumstances?
Most courts say yes."° Rather'than focusing on whether the ultimate decision
maker acted because of the employee's race, sex or age, these courts use a causation
approach in determining whether employer liability exists. They examine whether
there is a break in the chain of causation between the supervisor's impermissibly
motivated action and the ultimate decision being challenged by the employee. 07 If
the chain of causation is intact, liability is imposed, even when the ultimate decision
maker himself acted with no intent to discriminate.
In Willis v. Marion County Auditor's Office, for example, the Seventh Circuit
described this causation-based approach for imputing a subordinate employee's
motivation to the employer.'
Our cases have noted that this situation may occur in an instance in which
a subordinate, by concealing relevant information from the decisionmaker,
is able to manipulate the decisionmaking process and to influence the
decision. These cases prevent an employer from escaping liability by
103. Id. at 143. "This knowing and informed toleration of discriminatory statements by those
participating in the interview constitutes evidence of discrimination by all those present," said the court,
further finding that the discriminatory interview had affected the hiring process, as "the Board's hiring
decision was made in reliance upon a discriminatory recommendation." Id. For a discussion of the
Barbano case and others like it, see Gerken, supra note 66.
104. 219 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000).
105. Id. at 653.
106. Wallace v. SMC Pneumatics, Inc., 103 F.3d 1394 (7th Cir. 1997); Willis v. Marion County
Auditor's Office, 118 F.3d 542 (7th Cir. 1997); Long v. Eastfield College, 88 F.3d 300 (5th Cir. 1996);
Abrams v. Lightolier, Inc., 50 F.3d 1204 (3d Cir. 1995); Gusman v. Unisys Corp., 986 F.2d 1146 (7th
Cir. 1993); Kientzy v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 990 F.2d 1051 (8th Cir. 1993); Simpson v.
Diversitech Gen. Inc., 945 F.2d 156 (6th Cir. 1991); Jiles v. Ingram, 944 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1991);
Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398 (7th Cir. 1990).
107. See, e.g., Willis v. Marion County Auditor's Office, 118 F.3d 542 (7th Cir. 1997) (when the
causal relationship between the discriminatory motive of the biased decisionmaker is broken, then
ultimate decision to terminate is permissible. Otherwise, the jury may impute motive of the biased
subordinate to the company); Long v. Eastfield College, 88 F.3d 300 (5th Cir. 1996) (question is
whether chain of causation between supervisor's bias and president's decision was broken); Shager v.
Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398 (7th Cir. 1990) (liability depends upon whether causal link between
supervisor's prejudice and committee's decision has been severed).
108. 118 F.3d 542 (7th Cir. 1997).
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setting up many layers of pro forma review, thus making the operative
decision that of a subordinate with an illicit motive. In such a case, a jury
may impute the discriminatory motive of the biased subordinate, as
opposed to the motives of the ignorant decisionmaker, to the company.'09
However, the court noted, when the causal relationship between the motive and
the ultimate decision is broken, then the subordinate's bias is considered
irrelevant."0
Similarly, in Griffin v. Washington Convention Center, the court reversed a
magistrate's decision to exclude evidence that plaintiff's immediate supervisor was
opposed to women working as electricians."' The defendant had argued that the
evidence was irrelevant, since a supervisor higher in the decision making chain,
herself a woman, had made the ultimate decision to fire the plaintiff."' But
exclusion of the evidence was reversible error, the court stated, as it "would permit
a reasonable jury to infer that [plaintiff] lost her job on account of her sex" because
the termination decision was not "independent of, or insulated from" the immediate
supervisor's input. " He had made complaints about the plaintiff and had designed,
provided and evaluated the plaintiff's training program. "Thus do we join at least
four other circuits in holding that evidence of a subordinate's bias is relevant where
the ultimate decision maker is not insulated from the subordinate's influence," said
the court." 4
The vertical decision making cases, with their overt focus on causation,
demonstrate the lower courts' awareness that, at least in this context, disparate
treatment cases center on a causal inquiry. But these cases do not answer directly
the more subtle question of what must cause, in whole or in part, the employment
action at issue. Must some agent of the employer consciously take race, sex, or age
into account in order for race, sex, or age to cause the decision to occur? Or need
the plaintiff only show that her race, sex or age in fact caused the decision to occur,
whether or not she can show a conscious use of race, sex or age in the decision-
making process?
In the vertical decision making cases discussed above, it is proved, or assumed,
that a supervisory employee acted out of animus or bias." 5 That bias or animus may
109. Id. at 547.
110. Id. See Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Serv., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1232 (10th Cir. 2000)
(independent investigation and review broke chain of causation).
111. 142 F.3d 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
112. Id.at 1311.
113. Id. at 1313.
114. Id at 1312. See Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless, Corp., 217 F.3d 46 (1st Cir.
2000) (discriminatory statements by those in a position to influence key decision maker may be used
to show pretext); Hunt v. City of Markham, 219 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 2000) (statements made by decision
makers or those who provide input into the decisionmaking process are evidence of discrimination).
115. See, e.g., Griffin v. Washington Convention Ctr., 142 F.3d 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (plaintiff's
supervisor opposed to women working as electricians); Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless
Corp., 217 F.3d 46 (lstCir. 2000) (supervisor doubted women with children being able to do job); Hunt
v. City of Markham, 219 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 2000) (mayor stated city "needed to get rid of all the old
white police officers").
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take any number of forms and may taint the overall decision-making process in a
number of ways. As in Griffin v. Washington Convention Center,"6 the
supervisor may object to members of plaintiff's social group (women) serving in
particular occupational roles (electricians), and for that reason attempt to find
ostensibly non-discriminatory reasons for removing members of the disfavored
group from the jobs at issue. As in Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R.
Wireless," the supervisor may simply believe, as an empirical matter, that
members of a certain social group (women with children) are not generally
successful in particular positions. Or, as in Hunt v. City of Markham,' an
individual wielding influence over personnel decisions (the mayor) may simply
seek to provide jobs to members of his own social reference group (African
American men). In short, the biased supervisors whose recommendations
ultimately result in a negative employment action can be motivated by normative
stereotypes, "" cognitive stereotypes,' or simple in-group preferences.
Once they have determined that a biased, lower level supervisor had an
opportunity to influence the ultimate decision, these courts ask whether that
ultimate decision was sufficiently insulated from that animus or bias. An
invidiously motivated supervisor can, of course, influence a decision made higher
up the organizational hierarchy in a number of different ways. So, as the Seventh
Circuit observed in Wallace v. SMCPneumatics, Inc., 2 ' a biased supervisor may
conceal relevant information or even fabricate evidence, thus depriving the
ultimate decision maker of an accurate data set on which to base a final judgment.
Or, as Professor Sullivan has observed,' a biased employee with input into the
decision making process may influence that process simply by putting a certain
"spin" on decision-relevant events.
Whatever the nature of the distortion introduced by the biased subordinate,
courts look to see if the taint injected into the process was removed before the
ultimate decision was made. If not, liability is imposed. If the defect was
corrected, thereby breaking the causal chain, the employer is excused from
116. 142 F.3d 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (supervisor opposed to the idea of women working as
electricians).
117. 217 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 2000) (supervisor did not believe that a woman with a child would be
capable of doing the job).
118. 219 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 2000) (mayor stated that, to solve certain problems, the city "needed
to get rid of all the old white police officers").
119. By "normative stereotypes" we mean social role expectations, such as the beliefthat "women
should not be electricians." See Krieger, supra note 43, at 1278.
120. "Cognitive stereotypes" are knowledge structures-implicit expectancies that membership
in a particular social group is predictive of past or future behavior, or of particular traits, abilities, or
aptitudes. See id.
121. 103 F.3d 1394 (7th Cir. 1997).
122. See Sullivan, supra note 7, at 1139 n.I 17("Even ifB faithfully reviews A's recommendations,
A may be able to skew B's decision by the way in which he presents (or fails to present) data. This may
range from putting the preferred 'spin' on the recommendation to fabricating evidence concerning the
candidate.").
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liability."
Although these cases do not directly stand for the proposition that the
unconscious use of a protected characteristic can result in a viable disparate
treatment claim, indirectly, they support that view. The courts in these cases are not
asking whether the person who fired the plaintiff was aware that group status was
playing a role in the outcome. They accept that even in the absence of such
awareness a disparate treatment claim may exist. In other words, for liability to
attach, the person who fires the plaintiff need not intend to make the decision
because of the plaintiff's group status, if group status in fact played a causal role in
the decision making process.
There are strong parallels between how, in the vertical decision making
context, a biased actor operating lower in the organizational hierarchy chain can
cause a discriminatory decision to be made higher up and how, in single actor
situations, unconscious stereotypes can cause discrimination even in the absence of
conscious intent to discriminate. In light of these parallels, there is no sound basis
for centering the inquiry on causation in vertical decision making contexts while
searching single-mindedly for conscious intent to discriminate in single actor
situations. In the single decision maker context, cognitive stereotypes can function
in precisely the same way as does the invidiously motivated supervisor in vertical
decision making situations, distorting the data set on which a decision will be based
and putting a particular, stereotype-reinforcing "spin" on decision-relevant
information. Extending the analogy, to prevent stereotypes from tainting her
judgment and ultimately causing her to discriminate, the single decision
maker-like the ultimate decision maker in a vertical, multi-actor context-must
take affi-mative steps to insulate herself from the effects of bias. To see how and
why this is so, we must do a little cognitive psychology.
A stereotype is best understood as a type of schema. A schema, in turn, is best
understood as a "knowledge structure,"' 24 a network of interrelated elements
representing a person's knowledge, beliefs, experiences (both direct and vicarious),
and expectancies relating to the schematized object. 25  As many social
psychologists have demonstrated, people learn at a very early age the stereotypes
associated with the major social groups in the United States.'26 These stereotypes
have a long history of activation and are likely to be highly salient, regardless of
whether or not they are believed by the person holding them.'27
123. See Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Serv., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220 (10th Cir. 2000).
124. Richard E. Nisbett & Lee Ross, Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social
Judgment 6-7 (1980).
125. See generally William F. Brewer & Glenn V. Nakamura, The Nature and Function of
Schemas, in 1 Handbook of Social Cognition 119 (Robert S. Wyer & Thomas K. Srull, eds. 1984)
(providing an overview of schema theory, particularly as it relates to social cognition).
126. See generally Patricia G. Devine, Automatic and Controlled Processes in Prejudice: The
Role of Stereotypes and Personal Beliefs, in Attitude Structure and Function 181, 182-84 (Anthony R.
Pratkanis et al. eds., 1989) (collecting sources). See also Phyllis A. Katz, The Acquisition of Racial
Attitudes in Children, in Towards the Elimination of Racism 125 (Phyllis A. Katz ed., 1976) (describing
processes of stereotype acquisition in pre-school age children).
127. See generally Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and
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Stereotypes, like other schemas, are automatically triggered when people
encounter a member of a stereotyped group. Once triggered, the stereotype
"primes" or "activates" the various trait constructs and other features with which it
is associated." 8 It is useful to think of a stereotype as a network of associations,
that, once primed, "lights up" in the mind and prepares to "get to work."
Stereotypes can covertly, but powerfully, influence the way information about
a stereotyped person is processed and used. Stereotypes shape the interpretation of
incoming information,'29 determine the manner in which that information is encoded
into memory'30 and the ease with which it is retrieved from memory,' and they
affect the way information, once retrieved, is used in making judgments about a
stereotyped person at a later point in time.'
Cognitive stereotypes often function not as consciously held beliefs, but as
implicit expectancies. Through the mediation of various mental processes,
functioning largely outside of conscious awareness,"' a stereotype, like an
invidiously motivated supervisor reporting to his superior, covertly biases the data
on which a social judgment will be made, skewing that judgment in a stereotype-
reinforcing direction.
Single actor decisions influenced by stereotypes are, in this sense, little
different than decisions made in vertical multiple actor contexts. Bias intrudes into
the decision making process not through a conscious intent to discriminate when the
ultimate decision is made, but much earlier, as information about the stereotyped
person is being attended to, interpreted, encoded into and retrieved from memory,
and combined with other information to make a fmal decision. This is an important
point. Single actor decisions, like their vertical, multi-actor counterparts, are not
made at a discrete moment in time. The Price-Waterhouse plurality's
characterization to the contrary, there is, as a matter of good social science, no real
Controlled Components, 56 1. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 5, 6-7 (distinguishing stereotypes from
beliefs).
128. Devine, supra note 127, at 3-9.
129. H. Andrew Sagar & Janet Ward Schofield, Racial and Behavioral Cues in Black and White
Children 's Perceptions ofAmbiguously Aggressive Acts, 39 J. Personality& Soc. Psychol. 590 (1980)
(demonstrating that precisely the same behaviors were interpreted as either "playful" and "friendly,"
or "mean" and "aggressive," depending on whether the actor was black or white).
130. Myron Rothbart et al., Recall for Confirming Events: Memory Processes and the
Maintenance of Social Stereotypes, 15 J. Experimental Soc. Psychol. 343 (1979) (demonstrating that
stereotype-consistent'information is encoded into memory in a way that makes it easier to recall than
stereotype-inconsistent or stereotype-irrelevant information).
131. Id. See also Nancy Cantor & Walter Mischel, Prototypicality and Personality: Effects on
Free Recall and Personality Impressions, 13 J. Res. in Personality 187, 188-92 (1979) (replicating
Rothbart, Evans & Fulero and exploring issues relating ip retrieval from memory).
132. Galen V. Bodenhausen & Robert S. Wyer, Jr., Effects of Stereotypes on Decision Making and
Information-Processing Strategies, 48 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 267 (1985) (demonstrating that
subjects are more likely to attribute stereotype-consistent transgressions to stable traits, and for that
reason tend to judge the transgression as more likely to recur and therefore to impose a harsher penalty
than when the same transgression is committed by a non-stereotyped person).
133. John Kihlstrom refers to these functions as the "cognitive unconscious." John F. Kihlstrom,
The Cognitive Unconscious, in 237 Science 1445 (1987).
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"moment of decision"'34 in any social judgment situation. Rather, social judgment
and decision making is always an integrated system comprising attention,
perception, interpretation, attribution, memory, and ultimatejudgment. Stereotypes
bias social judgment quite early in this process, and can cause even a well-
intentioned decision maker to take an action or make a decision "based on" the
target's protected group membership.
In short, even when an employment decision is made by a single actor, decision
making proceeds in a sequence of functional stages. The structure of this sequence,
and the functions being performed at each stage, are similar in many respects to the
structure of vertical decision making in organizations. As many organization
behavior theorists have observed, organizations process information in stages and
exhibit information processing strategies closely analogous to those performed by
individuals. 35
Along these lines, Patricia Comer and her colleagues have proposed a "parallel
process model" comparing individual and organizational decision making. This
model breaks the organizational decision making process down into five stages
closely resembling the sequenced nature of social judgment described by social
cognition theorists. These stages include: (1) attention/perception, (2)
interpretation/encoding, (3) storage/retrieval, (4) choice, and (5) outcome. Inmany
vertical decision making situations, the attention, interpretation/encoding, and
storage/retrieval functions are performed by lower-level supervisors, whereas the
choice and outcome functions are performed higher up the organizational hierarchy,
often following a supervisor's report and recommendation. Biases influencing
perception and judgment on the supervisor's part, or otherwise corrupting the
"record" of information stored and made available to decision makers functioning
higher in the vertical chain, if not corrected, lead to results as clearly tainted by bias
as it would be in cases involving a biased individual decision maker.
For this reason, the vertical decision making cases are particularly useful in
understanding how we should think about discriminatory motivation in single actor
situations. Rather than a search for conscious discriminatory intent, the inquiry in
a disparate treatment cases should focus on whether race, sex, national origin, or
age in fact caused the decision to occur, in whole or in part. 6 Just as an ultimate
134. The plurality opinion in Price Waterhouse states:
The present, active tense of the operative verbs of §703(a)(1) ("to fail or refuse")... turns
our attention to the actual moment of the event in question, the adverse employment
decision. The crucial inquiry, the one commanded by the words of §703(a)(1), is whether
gender was a factor in the employment decision at the moment it was made.
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240-41, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1785 (1989).
135. Patricia Doyle Comer, et al., Integrating Organizational and Individual Information
Processing Perspecti.,es on Choice, in Cognition Within and Between Organizations 145 (James R.
Meidl et al., eds., 1996); D.A. Gioia, Symbols, Scripts, and Sensemaking: Creating Meaning in the
Organizational Experience, in The Thinking Organization: Dynamics of Organizational Social
Cognition 49 (J.P.Sims, et. al., eds., 1986); B. Levitt & J. G. Marsh, Organizational Learning, in
Annual Review of Sociology 319 (W.R. Scott & J. Black, eds., 1988).
136. Importantly, the degree of causation required under employment discrimination laws, as
mentioned earlier, is uncertain'and may vary depending upon the statutory claim. Section 703(m) of
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decision maker in a vertical chain may be unaware of a subordinate's animus, an
individual decision maker may be unaware of the effect of implicit stereotypes on
his or her own social judgment. But that unawareness, whether it occurs in the
context of multi-level decision making or in the context of a single decision maker,
does not mean the protected characteristic has not in fact caused the decision to
occur. And when it has, disparate treatment based on the protected characteristic
has occurred as well.
B. Employer Liability for Discrimination: The Vicarious Liability Inquiry
Finding a causal link between a protected characteristic and a challenged
decision may establish disparate treatment, but it may not necessarily establish a
viable disparate treatment claim. The disparate treatment must be attributable to an
employer, either directly or vicariously, before the employer may be held liable for
it. Although the courts in multiple actor cases usually have not coupled their
discussion of causation with an analysis of vicarious liability principles, 137 the
decisions may be best understood on that basis.
A recent decision from the Tenth Circuit, Kendrick v. Penske Transportation
Services, Inc., aptly demonstrates this point. 31 There, Tirrell, a low level
supervisor, reported that the plaintiff had shoved and verbally abused him. That
complaint was investigated by another supervisor, Levine, who gave plaintiff an
opportunity to respond. Plaintiff refused to respond. The investigating supervisor
then recommended to the company's Human Resource manager, Cash, that plaintiff
be terminated based on the alleged misconduct. The manager accepted that
recommendation and fired the plaintiff.139  Even assuming the allegations of
misconduct were untrue and that Tirell's decision to complain was racially
motivated, the court found insufficient evidence of discrimination. Noting that
plaintiff had been given, and had rejected, an opportunity to respond to Tirrell's
allegations, the court found insufficient evidence of discrimination. As the court
noted:
Kendrick has provided no evidence to show that Levine's investigation
was a sham or that Tirrell's allegedly discriminatory motives influenced
Levine, nor does Kendrick offer any evidence that Levine or Cash acted
Title VII requires only that the protected characteristic was "a motivating factor," which appears to
remove "but-for" causation as a requisite for liability. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
Some courts, however, limit Section 703(m) only to Title VlI claims involving direct evidence of
discrimination. Moreover, the motivating factor analysis set forth in Section 703(m) may not be
available to any claims other than those arising under Section 703, whether or not direct evidence is
involved. Id.
137. But see Long v. Eastfield College, 88 F.3d 300,306 (5th Cir. 1996) (recognizing "the overlap
of issues of causation and agency" in determining whether a university could be liable for
discrimination when a supervisor with animus recommended termination but the college president who
made the decision did not).
138. 220 F.3d 1220(10th Cir. 2000).
139. Id. at 1223-24.
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upon a discriminatory motive in their own right. The undisputed evidence
shows that Cash discharged Kendrick based on Levin's report that
[plaintiff] pushed and verbally abused Tirrell.'"
Were causation the only element needed for a discrimination claim, the
Kendrick case would seem wrongly decided. Had plaintiff not been black, he
would not have been accused of misconduct. And had those accusations not been
made, he would not have been the subject of an investigation that ultimately
resulted in his discharge. Thus, Kendrick's race would seem to be at least a
motivating factor, if not the but-for cause, of his termination.
Yet the Kendrick decision, on the facts found by the court, is probably
correct. 4 ' This is so because the only act that was assumed to have been
impermissibly motivated was the accusation of shoving and verbal abuse. But that
accusation was not self-enforcing. Instead, it merely triggered an investigation into
Kendrick's conduct.'42 The investigation itself was found to have been conducted
in a nondiscriminatory manner, and it was the recommendation coming out of the
investigation that led to Kendrick's discharge.' Since no action properly
attributable to the employer was the product of an intent to discriminate, imposing
liability on Kendrick's employer might well have been impermissible under the
vicarious liability standards articulated by the Supreme Court .in Burlington
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth.'"
In Ellerth, the Supreme Court for the first time explained the theories
underlying vicarious employer liability for discrimination under federal employment
discrimination statutes. 4 When a supervisor's action is within the scope of his
employment, vicarious employer liability will exist.'" To be within the scope of
employment, however, the act must be motivated, at least in part, by a purpose to
serve the employer's interests.' Sometimes, decisions that are the product of an
140. Id. at 1231-32.
141. This statement is limited to the court's analysis of the multiple actor issue. There was
additional evidence of race discrimination that appears to have been discounted by the court.
142. Id. at 1223-24.
143. Id. at 1231-32.
144. 524 U.S. 742,118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998).
145. Because the statutes define employer to include "agents" of the employer, the Court was
guided by common law agency principles in fashioning its vicarious liability standards. However, the
common law served merely as a guide to the Court in developing "a uniform and predictable standard"
of vicarious liability under Title VII. 524 U.S. at 760, 118 S. Ct. at 2268.
Although Ellerth was a sexual harassment case, the reasoning put forward was not limited to the
sexual harassment context, and many of the cases relied upon by the Court in explaining when vicarious
employer liability is appropriate were disparate treatment claims not involving sexual harassment. Id.
at 752-53, 118 S. Ct. at 2264. Thus, Ellerth's reasoning should be applicable outside the sexual
harassment context. See Rebecca Hanner White, There's Nothing Special About Sex: The Supreme
Court Mainstreams Sexual Harassment, 7 Wim. & Mary Bill of Rights J. 725, 743, 750-53 (1999) for
elaboration of this point.
146. 524 U.S. at 756, 118 S. Ct. at 2266. See also Section 219(1) of the Restatement (Second)
of Agency ("A master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants committed while acting in the
scope of their employment.").
147. 524 U.S. at 757, 118 S. Ct. at 2266.
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intent to discriminate will not be motivated by a purpose to serve the employer's
interests. 48 Nonetheless, vicarious employer liability always will exist if the
supervisor's impermissibly motivated conduct amounts to a tangible employment
action. "9 This is because the supervisor's ability to engage in the wrongful conduct
necessarily will have been aided by the agency relationship."'
Importantly, the Ellerth Court expressly recognized the appropriateness of
holding the employing entity liable for a supervisory employee's impermissibly
motivated actions, even when the ultimate decision makers were unaware of the
reasons why the supervisor acted.' Because a tangible employment action could
not occur without the delegation of authority to the supervisor, that delegation is a
sufficient basis for holding the employer liable for the supervisor's wrongdoing. '
The Ellerth Court did not definitively determine what constitutes a tangible
employment action.' Ellerth has been interpreted by some courts to require a
materially adverse action.'" However, when one considers the reasoning embraced
in Ellerth for imposing vicarious liability, one should view a tangible job action as
any action that a supervisor is empowered to engage in by virtue of his supervisory
authority.' Tangible employment actions are actions that a supervisor's status as
supervisor enables him to take. 6
But if the impermissibly motivated conduct is conduct that is not the exclusive
province of supervisors, then vicarious liability will not exist.' Many such cases,
if they are actionable at all, would be presented as hostile work environment
harassment claims. In such situations, the employer will be vicariously liable for
the impermissibly motivated conduct of its supervisors only if the conduct is
sufficiently severe or pervasive, and even then, the employer may assert an
148. The Court recognized this will generally be true in cases involving sexual harassment, as a
supervisor who engages in sexual harassment is unlikely to be motivated in whole or in part by a
purpose to serve his employer's interests. Id.
149. "[A] tangible employment action taken by the supervisor becomes for Title VII purposes the
act of the employer." Burlington Indust., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 762, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2269
(1998).
150. Id.
151. As the Court stated, "A tangible employment decision requires an official act of the
enterprise, a company act. The decision in most cases is documented in official company records, and
may be subject to review by higher level supervisors. E.g., Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405
(7th Cir. 1990) (noting that the supervisor did not fire plaintiff; rather, the Career Path Committee did,
but the employer was still liable because the Committee functioned as the supervisor's 'cat's-paw')."
Id. at 762, 118 S. Ct. at 2269.
152. Id. at 759-60, 118 S. Ct. at 2267-68.
153. "A tangible employment action constitutes a significant change in employment status, such
as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a
decision causing a significant change in benefits." Id. at 761, 118 S. Ct. at 2268.
154. See Johnson v. Booker T. Washington Broadcasting Servs., Inc., 234 F.3d 501 (11 th Cir.
2000) (discussing need for sufficiently adverse action).
155. The employment relationship necessarily aids the supervisor in accomplishing his wrong
when a tangible employment action occurs because "there is assurance the injury could not have been
inflicted absent the agency relation." 524 U.S. at 761-62, 118 S. Ct. at 2269.
156. Rebecca Hanner White, De Minimis Discrimination, 47 Emory L.J. 1121, 1155-60(1998).
157. 524 U.S. at 762-63, 118 S. Ct. at 2269.
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affirmative defense to liability. 5 s If the employer had in place a procedure designed
to prevent and correct the harassment and the employee unreasonably failed to take
advantage of those procedures, the employer will not be liable for the supervisor's
impermissibly motivated conduct.'59
Under the approach we propose, other cases alleging discriminatory terms and
conditions of employment, on the other hand, might lead to automatic, vicarious
liability. So, for example, an employer would be held vicariously liable if a
supervisor, motivated by an employee's group status, denied him equal training
opportunities or job assignments, or unfairly denigrated his performance or
potential in connection with a performance evaluation. These are acts that are
within the supervisor's sole province, that he or she is empowered to perform by
virtue of his or her position with the employer.
What does this have to do with the Kendrick decision and others like it?
Actually, quite a lot. Recall that in Kendrick the only action that was assumed to
have been impermissibly motivated was Tirrell's allegation that Kendrick had
pushed and verbally abused him. " Alleging that someone has engaged in physical
and verbal abuse would not seem to be a tangible employment action. Such
allegations presumably could be made by any employee; one need not be a
supervisor to accuse someone of physical and verbal abuse. There were no
allegations of the sort of severe and pervasive harassment that may result in
vicarious liability when no tangible job action is present. Simply put, although
Kendrick alleged that impermissibly motivated conduct had occurred, and a causal
relationship between that conduct and his termination could be shown, he was
unable to show impermissibly motivated conduct by his employer. Thus, he had no
claim.. 6.
Understanding the limits of vicarious liability eases concerns that causation
analysis imposes liability for discrimination on a too attenuated basis. For
example, in her dissent in-Simpson v. Diversitech General, Inc., Judge Kennedy
criticized a decision upholding employer liability when the ultimate decision maker
had no discriminatory intent, arguing the "but-for" causation test is overinclusive. 62
To support her point, she put forward the following hypothetical: what if a fellow
employee reports a co-worker's theft because of racial animus. If the employer
158. Id. at 764-65, 118 S. Ct. at 2270.
159. "The defense comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable
care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiffemployee
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the
employer or to avoid harm otherwise." Id. at 765, 118 S. Ct. at 2270.
160. Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1231 (10th Cir. 2000).
161. A potential problem with this analysis, as applied to the Kendrick decision, is that the claim
was brought under Section 1981, not Title VII. One need not be a statutory employer to be liable for
employment discrimination under Section 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000), which prohibits race
discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts. However, since Kendrick did not sue Tirrell
but instead sought to hold his employer vicariously liable for Tirrell's wrongdoing, it is likely the Court
would apply the Ellerth rationale for vicarious liability to discrimination claims under Section 1981.
162. 945 F.2d 156, 161-62 (6th Cir. 1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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investigates and fires the employee because of theft, "under the majority's reasoning
that discharge would be 'because of' race."' 63
Although causation admittedly would exist, Judge Kennedy's hypothetical in
fact would not, under the approach we propose, result in employer liability. While
impermissibly motivated conduct causally related to a discharge would be present,
there would be no impermissibly motivated conduct attributable to an employer or
its agents, given that a "fellow employee" was the individual with the impermissible
motive.'6 Thus, the reasoning of Ellerth properly would result in a finding of no
liability in Judge Kennedy's hypothetical situation. Under the actual facts of the
Diversitech case, however, liability was properly imposed. Disciplinary action that
was the product of a supervisor's racial animus was causally linked to the plaintiff's
discharge. 65 Discipline is a tangible job action that a supervisor's status as
supervisor empowers him to take.' 6" Accordingly, because an impermissibly
motivated tangible job action causally related to the discharge occurred, the
employer was properly held liable for the termination.
The following year, however, Judge Kennedy was able to persuade a different
Sixth Circuit panel to reject the causation based analysis followed by the
Diversitech court. In Cesaro v. Lakeville Community School District, a school
district decided to hire a Director of Special Education, leaving it to the sole
discretion of the superintendent whether to restrict the search to internal candidates
or open it up to outsiders' 67 The only qualified insider was a woman, and she
alleged that the superintendent opened the search to outsiders in order to avoid
filling the job with a woman. 6 ' However, plaintiff stipulated that the individual
ultimately hired by the School Board was "unquestionably the most qualified," and
the trial court found that sex did not play a part in the Board's hiring decision.69
On these facts, with its two levels of decision making, the Sixth Circuit, in an
opinion by Judge Kennedy, found no discrimination. "Although [the
superintendent] may have acted with a discriminatory motive in opening
applications to outside candidates, we cannot find liability for mere use of a process
by which the most qualified candidate was ultimately selected in a
nondiscriminatory manner."' 7
Cesaro, in our view, was wrongly decided. The causal chain between the
superintendent's impermissibly motivated act, and the ultimate decision complained
of, was unbroken. Had plaintiff not been a woman, the search would not have been
opened to outsiders, and she would have obtained the job. Moreover, the decision
to open the search to outsiders was a tangible employment action; it was an action
163. Id. at 162.
164. See Long v. Eastfield College, 88 F.3d 300,306 (5th Cir. 1996) (recognizing that employer
generally not liable for impermissibly motivated actions of co-workers).
165. Id. at 160.
166. See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
167. 953 F.2d 252,253 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 867, 113 S. Ct. 195 (1992).
168. Id. at 254.
169. Id. at 253.
170. Id. at 256.
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the superintendent's position as superintendent empowered him to take. Thus, the
Board should have been held vicariously liable for that impermissibly motivated
action. That the Board, as the ultimate decision maker, had no intent to
discriminate is irrelevant, as numerous courts have recognized, when the
subordinate's tangible employment action plays a causal role in the challenged
decision.
C. Breaking the Causal Chain: Organizational Correction of Biased
Evaluations
Most vertical decision making cases involve a lower level supervisor or
manager's recommendation to someone higher in the organizational hierarchy,
proposing that he or she take a particular employment action, such as a new hire,
a promotion, or a disciplinary action up to and including termination, with respect
to a particular employee or applicant. Often, particularly in cases involving
disciplinary action, this recommendation is supported by a factual record of some
sort, compiled by lower level supervisor or manager, and used by the ultimate
decision maker in coming to an eventual decision. Sometimes that decision is made
only after the higher-level manager has performed an ostensibly independent
investigation. In cases of this sort, where the supervisor's recommendation was
tainted by discriminatory motivation, how should a court go about determining
whether the causal chain has been broken and the supervisor's bias purged from the
decision-making process? In approaching this problem we suggest that insights
from the social sciences again prove helpful in formulating a sound doctrinal
framework.
First and foremost, courts must take care not to assume from the apparent
neutrality of an employer's "independent" investigation that the ultimate decision
was not substantially influenced by the supervisor's original report. Many courts
examining vertical decision making for the presence or absence of disparate
treatment implicitly assume that the ultimate decision maker who receives a
recommendation from a lower level supervisor and, foliowing his or her own
investigation, ultimately acts on that recommendation, has approached the decision
de novo.
Cognitive social psychology teaches that this is not a reasonable assumption.
Once a recommendation has been made, it will tend to function as a prior theory-a
tentative hypothesis. As such, it can reasonably be expected to influence the
ultimate decision maker'sjudgment in a recommendation-consistent direction, even
ifhe conducts his own investigation. This tendency, which is known as "expectancy
confirmation bias,"'' will be magnified where the deficiencies or transgressions
171. The empirical and theoretical literature on expectancy confirmation bias is vast, and we can
not begin to reference all the major contributions here. Interested readers are referred to the following
leading sources: Charles G. Lord, et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects
of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 2098
(1979); Einhom J. Hillel & Robin Hogarth, Confidence in Judgment: Persistence of the Illusion of
Validity, 85 Psychological Review 395 (1978); Mark Snyder & William B. Swann Jr., Hypothesis-
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grounding the supervisor's report or recommendation are consistent with a
stereotype associated with the target employee's social group.'
The key cognitive tendency underlying the expectancy confirmation bias was
first illustrated by P. C. Wason in a pair of now classic studies conducted in the
1960s.' In the earlier of these, Wason asked subjects to imagine a universe
consisting of all possible combinations of any three numbers, some but not all of
which would conform to a rule known only to the experimenter. Subjects were
presented with one such triplet (e.g., 2-4-6) they were told fit the rule. They then
were invited to ask the experimenter whether or not other triplets they could think
of would fit it as well. Wason discovered that subjects very quickly developed a
tentative theory (usually, that rule-conforming combinations would be triplets
consisting of consecutive even numbers). But more important to our present
inquiry, Wason also found that subjects went about testing that tentative theory by
inquiring only about other triplets that would conform to the assumed rule (e.g. 8-
10-12). Once they developed a tentative hypothesis, subjects rarely inquired about
number combinations that might disconfirm it. Their stubborn adherence to this
confirmatory test strategy significantly delayed their attempt to identify the actual
rule (e.g, increasing numbers of whatever kind).
In a second experiment, Wason presented subjects with four cards, reading "E,"
"K," "4," and "7." While viewing the cards, subjects were asked which ones would
have to be turned over to test the theory that "if a card has a vowel on one side, then
it has an even number on the other." Because only the "E" and "7" cards are
capable ofdisconfirming the theory, they are the normatively appropriate selections.
Most subjects, however, (and you might try this on your friends) selected the "E"
and "4," cards, those capable of confirming the theory.
74
Subsequent research has demonstrated quite convincingly that when presented
with a claim (i.e., Mary is a poor performer and should be fired), people tend to
treat the claim as a tentative hypothesis and proceed to test that hypothesis by
searching for evidence that will confirm it.'"7 Moreover, once people have, in this
Testing Processes in Social Interaction, 36 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 1202 (1978).
172. See generally John M. Darley & Paget H. Gross, A Hypothesis-Confirming Bias in Labeling
Effects, 44 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 20 (1983) (demonstrating how expectancy confirmation bias
leads to the reinforcement of social stereotypes); John M. Darley & Rullsel H. Fazio, Expectancy
Confirmation Processes Arising in the Social Interaction Sequence, 35 Amer. Psychologist 867 (1980)
(same); Mark Snyder, Seek; and Ye Shall Find: Testing Hypotheses About Other People, I Social
Cognition: The Ontario Symposium 277 (E.T. Higgins, E. P. Herman, & Mark P. Zanna, eds., 1981)
(review of literature on hypothesis-confirming strategies used in testing hypothesis about stereotyped
others).
173. P.C. Wason & P.N. Johnson-Laird, P. N. The Psychology of Reasoning: Structure and
Content (1972); P.C. Wason, On the Failure to Eliminate Hypotheses in a Conceptual Task, 12
Quarterly Rev. of Exp. Psychol. 129 (1960).
174. A useful discussion of the Wason card study can be found in Joshua Klayman & Young-Won
Ha, Confirmation, Disconfirmation, and Information in Hypothesis Testing, in Research in Judgment
and Decision Making: Currents, Connections, and Controversies 205,226 n. 5 (William M. Goldstein
& Robin M. Hogarth, eds., 1997)
175. See Yaacov Trope & Erik P. Thompson, Looking for Truth in All the Wrong Places?
Asymmetric Search of lndividuating Information About Stereotyped Group Members, 73 J. Personality
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way, begun treating a proposition as a tentative theory, they tend to view theory-
confirming information as more probative than theory-disconfirming information, 76
and they interpret, encode, and retrieve theory-confirming evidence on a
preferential basis.'
Social expectancy confirmation effects of this type appear strongest in precisely
those situations likely to be present in employment discrimination cases, namely,
where the decision maker occupies a position of power over the target,' and where
the boundary of the hypothesis being tested is relatively extreme. 79 In short, there
is no reasoned basis to assume prima facie that an ostensibly "independent"
investigation of a biased (especially a covertly biased) supervisor's allegation or
recommendation will correct or "purge" bias introduced earlier in the process. This
is particularly true if the supervisor's allegation or recommendation is presented to
the ultimate decision maker along with a reasonably well constructed factual
account supporting his or her position,"' or if the problem involves traits or conduct
& Soc. Psychol. 229 (1997) (subjects provided with category based expectancies about target people
went about gathering information to make an independent judgement by asking questions that, by their
nature, were more likely to elicit confirmatory versus disconfirmatory information); Snyder, supra note
172, at 282; See also William B. Swann & Toni Guiliano, Confirmatory Search Strategies in Social
Interaction: How, When. Why, and with What Consequences," 5 J. Soc. & Clinical Psychol. 511
(1987) (demonstrating that people test their beliefs about others by searching for evidence that confirms
those beliefs); Mark Snyder & Nancy Cantor, Testing Hypotheses About Other People: The Use of
Historical Knowledge, 15 J. Experimental Soc. Psychol. 330 (1979) (in a social judgment situation,
subjects consistently defined the hypothesis testing task as one of preferentially collecting hypothesis-
confirming information).
176. See generally, Snyder, supra note 172, at 295-96; Swann& Guiliano, supra note 175, at 522
(study demonstrating that simply entertaining a belief raises the perceived diagnosticity of supportive
evidence). See also, Lord, et al., supra note 171, at 2098 (people who hold opinions tend to accept
confirming information at face value while subjecting disconfirming information to critical scrutiny).
177. Jennifer Crocker, et al., Person Memory and Causal Attribution, 44 J. Personality & Soc.
Psychol. 55 (1983) (discussing attribution and memory processes in relation to expectancy-consistent,
expectancy-inconsistent, and expectancy-irrelevant information).
178. Much recent work on expectancy confirmation in social interaction explores the effect of
relative power on confirmatory search strategies. These studies consistently find that persons in
positions of relative power over their targets are more likely to use confirmatory search strategies than
are people with relatively less power over their targets are makingjudgments about their superiors. See
generally Monica J. Harris, et al., Awareness of Power as a Moderator of Expectancy Confirmation:
Who's the Boss AroundHere, 20 Basic & Applied Soc. Psychol. 220 (1998) (demonstrating the efficacy
of perceiver power as a moderator of expectancy confirmation in social judgment); Steven L. Neuberg,
Expectancy-Confirmation Processes in Stereotype-Tinged Social Encounters: The Moderating Role
of Social Goals, in 7 The Psychology of Prejudice: The Ontario Symposium 103 (Mark P. Zanna &
James M. Olson, eds., 1994); Susan T. Fiske, Controlling Other People: The Impact of Power on
Stereotyping, 48 Amer. Psychol. 621 (1993); S.T. Fiske & S.L. Neuberg, A Continuum oflImpression
Formation, From Category-Based to Individuating Processes: Influences of Information and
Motivation on Attention and Interpretation, in 23 Advances in Experimental Soc. Psychol. I (Mark P.
Zanna, ed., 1990).
179. See Yaacov Trope & Miriam Bassok, Information-Gathering Strategies in Hypothesis-
Testing, 19 J. Experimental Soc. Psychol. 560 (1983) (finding hypothesis-confirming search strategies
where the boundary of the expectancy was extreme).
180. See generally, Susan Bisom-Rapp, Bulletproofing the Workplace: Symbol and Substance
in Employment Discrimination Law Practice, 26 Fl. S. U. L. Rev. 959 (1999) (demonstrating
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consistent with a stereotype commonly associated with the target employee's social
group.
In both single actor and vertical multi-actor contexts, bias injected into the
decision making process early in the social judgment sequence can be purged only
through affrmative efforts at bias correction. Such an affirmative process would
require, among other things, explicitly considering the possibility that bias had
influenced the process at its earlier stages, assuring that all available allegation or
recommendation-inconsistent facts have been energetically developed and their
potential implications thoroughly explored, and subjecting all recommendation-
consistent information to rigorous critical scrutiny. Significantly, these are the same
types of steps that individual decision makers must take to ensure that unconscious
stereotypes do not influence their social judgment and lead them unwittingly to
make discriminatory decisions."
In summary, we propose that it should be the combination of two elements-
a causal chain' between the plaintiff's protected group status and the challenged
decision, and vicarious or direct employer liability for each relevant link in that
chain-that results in a viable disparate treatment claim. Without both no claim
should exist. But when both are present, neither that the ultimate decision maker
had no intent to discriminate, nor even that no conscious intent to discriminate
existed at any step of the process, should defeat the plaintiff s case.
D. Remedial Implications
Proof of two elements, including a causal link between the plaintiffs group
status and the challenged decision, and vicarious employer liability for that causal
link, should be sufficient to establish disparate treatment liability. However, a
finding of liability does not in all instances entitle a plaintiff to the full panoply of
remedies available under employment discrimination laws. For example, under
Title VII, a defendant's showing that it would have made the same decision even
if it had not taken the protected factor into account serves to limit the remedies to
which a plaintiff is entitled. 3 Under other statutes, such a showing may defeat
employers' ability, through their control of personnel documentation and their access to legal advice,
to create a one-sided narrative justifying even an unlawfully biased personnel action).
181. For a thorough discussion of the role of controlled processes in controlling the unconscious
effects of stereotypes on social judgment, see Timothy D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke, Mental
Contamination and Mental Correction: Unwanted Influences on Judgments and Evaluations, 116
Psychological Bull. 117 (1994); See also Patricia G. Devine, supra note 126.
182. Whether the causation inquiry demands a showing of "but-for" causation depends upon the
ultimate interpretation of Section 703(m) of Title VII and the statutory claims to which its reach
ultimately extends. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
183. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2) (B) (Supp. 2000) ("On a claim in which an individual proves a
violation under section 703(m) and a respondent demonstrates that the respondent would have taken
the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor, the court-.... (ii.) shall not
award damages or issue an order requiring any admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment,
described in subparagraph (A))."
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liability entirely.'" Moreover, after-acquired evidence of a plaintiff's wrongdoing,
while not a basis for avoiding liability, may limit the relief available to the
plaintiff."5 These principles should apply and in some cases may well limit the
relief available in cases involving multiple decision makers, just as they do in a
single decision maker setting.
For example, suppose an ultimate decision maker is deciding whether to lay off
a particular worker, and in doing so, takes into account disciplinary actions
administered by several supervisors. Further suppose that one of those disciplinary
actions was racially motivated, but that the others were not. If the employer can
prove that the lay off would have occurred had the ultimate decision maker
considered only the nondiscriminatory disciplinary actions, then it should be able
to limit the remedies for the lay off under Title VII in accordance with Section
706(g)." " The impermissibly motivated disciplinary action would have been "a
motivating factor" in the layoff decision, but the employer would be entitled to
mount a Section 706(g)(2)(B) defense to damages arising from the layoff.
However, the employee should still be entitled to recover damages for the
disciplinary action that was caused by race. That discipline would constitute a
tangible employment action; thus, vicarious employer liability would exist.' That
the action is not an "ultimate" employment action, nor even one carrying immediate
economic consequences, should not render it non-actionable under Title VII.'88
Recovery for the dignitary harms8 9 caused by a racially premised disciplinary
action should be recoverable to the extent those damages are available under the
particular statute."' But the recovery would be for the harms caused by the
disciplinary action, not by the layoff. Moreover in cases in which the employer
cannot carry its burden of showing it would have made the same decision had the
racially premised disciplinary action not been taken into account, the plaintiffwould
be able to recover damages for the layoff itself.9'
184. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
185. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g. Co., 513 U.S. 352, 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995).
186. In this circumstance an employer might be able to avoid liability for the lay off entirely under
Section 1981. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
188. See White, supra note 156, for development of this point. However, there are a number of
courts that do require an "ultimate" or "materially adverse" job action in employment discrimination
cases. Id. at 1135-47. Were the reasoning of these courts to carry the day, the racially caused discipline
would not be actionable, leaving plaintiff without a remedy in situations in which the Section 706(g)
defense could be satisfied.
189. See Paul Brest, The Supreme Court 1975 Term. Foreword: In Defense of the Anti
Discrimination Principle, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1976); Weber, supra note 36, at 534 (discussing the
noneconomic harms of discrimination).
190. Compensatory and punitive damages have long been available under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000).
See Patterson v. McClean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 182 n.4, 109 S. Ct. 2363,2375 n.4 (1989). They
are now available under Title VII as well, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (a) (2000). Vicarious employer liability for
punitive damages must satisfy the heightened standard set forth in Kolstad v. American Dental Ass n,
527 U.S. 526, 119 S. Ct. 2118 (1999).
191. See, e.g., Simpson v. Diversitech Gen. Inc., 945 F.2d 156 (6th Cir. 1991); Barbano v.
Madison County, 922 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1990).
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Now consider a variation, one that demonstrates whether actors higher in the
chain of authority might remove the "taint" of a tangible employment action caused
by race or sex. Suppose a supervisor imposes a three day suspension on plaintiff
upon learning that plaintiff had stolen company product. However, the supervisor
is aware of similar theft by the plaintiff's co-workers, all of whom are white, and
has not disciplined those workers. Instead he has chosen to discipline the plaintiff,
who is black, because of his race. The disciplinary action triggers an investigation
into employee theft, and the Director of Human Resources, because of the
seriousness of thefts, decides to fire all employees who have been caught stealing,
including the plaintiff. What remedy should lie?
Certainly, there is a causal link between the plaintiff's race and his termination.
But for the plaintiff's race, he would not have been disciplined, there would have
been no investigation into employee theft, and no termination. Moreover, the
disciplinary act, a three day suspension, is a tangible employment action for which
the employer is vicariously liable. Is the employer then precluded from firing the
plaintiff because of this "taint"?
McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co. teaches that the answer is no.
There, the plaintiff removed company documents without her employer's
permission, a transgression that was uncovered during her deposition in connection
with her age discrimination case. The employer argued that this wrongdoing
relieved it of any liability for age discrimination, a proposition unanimously
rejected by the Supreme Court. If the employee was fired because of her age, she
was entitled to a remedy for that statutory violation. However, the Court went on
to hold that the employee's wrongdoing. could be considered in fashioning a
remedy. Balancing protection of the employee's statutory right to be free from age
discrimination against the employer's managerial prerogatives in running its
business, the Court concluded that the wrongdoing could serve to preclude
reinstatement and to cut off back pay liability as of the date of the employer's
discovery of the employee's wrongdoing:
Once an employer learns about employee wrongdoing that would lead to
a legitimate discharge, we cannot require the employer to ignore the
information, even if it is acquired during the course of discovery in a suit
against the employer and even if the information might have gone
undiscovered absent the suit. 192
These principles should govern the above-described hypothetical. Although
race discrimination led to the discovery of the employee's wrongdoing, the
employer would not be required to ignore that wrongdoing. If the employer can
show that it fired the plaintiff because of his theft, even if it learned of that theft
through a racially-premised disciplinary action, the termination itself would be
permissible.
Again, however, this result does not leave the plaintiff without a remedy. The
plaintiff still should be able to recover for the dignitary harms caused by the
192. 513 U.S. 352, 362, 115 S. Ct. 879, 886 (1995).
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supervisor's race-based disciplinary action. 93  Such a result serves the
compensatory and deterrence goals of the statute while respecting the employer's
legitimate business interests. Accordingly, while liability will exist in a vertical
decision making context when both the requisite degree of causation and vicarious
employer liability exist, the remedies available for that discrimination may be
limited by actions taken further up in the organizational hierarchy.
III. HORIZONTAL DECISION MAKING
Sometimes, employment decisions are made by a committee or other group of
individuals. In such situations, some persons within the group may act out of
hostile animus or prejudice, or may for some other reason deliberately factor race,
sex, age, or national origin into their decision making calculus. Others may
unconsciously act for those reasons. Still others may act for reasons having no
causal relationship to race, sex or age. In these horizontal decision making
situations, when may a decision properly be considered to have resulted from
"intentional discrimination"? Again, we suggest, a disparate treatment claim should
lie when the plaintiff's race, sex or age caused the decision to occur and where the
key actions in the causal chain can be attributed to the employer.
As others have observed, asking whether a group consciously intended to
discriminate makes little sense." As Professors Lee & Bhagwat, who advocate a
purely causation based approach to intent in constitutional cases, have noted:
In the collective context, the concept of conscious intent is not merely
difficult to prove, it is meaningless. Groups do not have mental states, and
while individual members of groups might be shown to possess particular
mental states, there is no evident reason to attribute the motive of any
particular individual to the group as a whole.'95
To apply the concept of conscious discriminatory intent literally in the group
decision making context one would have to determine the conscious motives of
each group member. One could then tally the results. Only if a majority
consciously took race, sex or age into account would a claim exist. But that
approach is at odds with our understanding of how groups work. 96 Within any
group, some persons are more influential than others. A strong personality,
consciously but secretly motivated by animus, may be able to influence a decision
even when a majority of the group's members had no awareness that race, sex or
age was playing a role. 97
193. See supra notes 187-91 and accompanying text.
194. Professor Sullivan points out, "The collegial body obviously does not 'think' at all; its human
members have whatever motivations may be relevant for Title VII purposes." Sullivan, supra note 7,
at 1139 n.T17.
195. Lee & Bhagwat, supra note 22, at 154. See Strauss, supra note 22 (viewing causation, not
conscious motive, as the proper way of understanding of intent in the Court's constitutional cases).
196. See Sullivan, supra note 7, at 1154.
197. Id. at 1139 n.1 17( noting that when "opinion leaders" act from a prohibited motive it may
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Moreover, at least in the context of legislative decision making, the Supreme
Court has recognized that a search for conscious intent on the part of individual
decision makers would be impracticable, if not impossible. 9 Plumbing the psyche
of each person who voted for a particular measure, constitutional concerns aside,
is unlikely to be productive. It is also unnecessary. If we examine the legislative
decision making cases closely, we see that the Court is searching, much as it does
in individual disparate treatment cases under Title VII, for evidence that group
status was a motivating factor in a legislative decision.'"
Indeed, in Hunter v. Underwood,200 in which the Court was required to
ascertain the intent of the entire 1901 Alabama Constitutional Convention, Justice
Rehnquist, writing for a unanimous Court, articulated a standard virtually identical
to that adopted in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. Stated Justice Rehnquist: "Once
racial discrimination is shown to have been a 'substantial' or 'motivating' factor
behind the enactment of the law, the burden shifts to the law's defenders to
demonstrate that the law would have been enacted without this factor." ''
Other decisions provide guidance regarding the types of evidence that can be
used in connection with this essentially causal inquiry. For example, in Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,2°2 the Court
specified various types of evidence that could be used to demonstrate that a
legislative body acted with a discriminatory purpose. These types of evidence
include the decision's impact on a protected group, the historical background
against which the decision was made, the events leading up to the decision, the
occurrence of substantive or procedural irregularities, and statements made by
members of the decision-making body. If we combine first, the Court's
acknowledgment in Hunter and O'Brien that a search for each individual
legislator's intention is impracticable, second, the simple fact that groups don't
"think," and third, the motivating factor/but-for causation analysis set out inHunter,
we are led inexorably to conclude that the critical inquiry in the legislative decision
making context cannot possibly center on conscious discriminatory intent, literally
be fair to find the decision wrongfully motivated, even when the "followers" are unaware of the
prohibited motive of the leaders); Elena Kagan, Private Speech. Public Purpose: The Role of
Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 413, 440 n.80 (1996)
(describing the disproportionate influence some legislators have and the difficulties that poses for
determining motive).
198. See, Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 228, 105 S. Ct. 1916, 1920 (1985) (stating,
"[p]roving the motivation behind official action is often a problematic undertaking."). See also United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383, 88 S. Ct. 1673, 1682 (1968) (stating that "inquiries into
congressional motives or purposes are a hazardous matter."). See Kagan, supra note 197, at 438-42
(discussing the difficulties of determining illicit motive in the legislative context; and characterizing
O'Brien as standing for the proposition that direct inquiry into motives for restricting speech very rarely
will prove productive.").
199. See Kagan, supra note 197, at442-43; See also Brest, supra note 189, at 120 (suggesting that
the search for motive in multiple decision maker cases should be treated the same as when a single
decision maker is involved).
200. 471 U.S. 222, 105 S. Ct. 1916 (1985).
201. 471 U.S. at 228, 105 S. Ct. at 1920.
202. 429 U.S. 252, 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977).
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understood.
As Professor Selmi asserts, Arlington Heights, with its focus on circumstantial
evidence, supports this approach. Some sort of collective conscious bias can not
logically be viewed as prerequisite to a finding of intentional discrimination in a
group decision making context. As Selmi notes: "Significantly, none of the factors
listed in Arlington Heights requires proof of knowledge or awareness on the part of
the actor, but rather all are circumstantial facts that give rise to an inference of
discrimination.""2 3 The question of discriminatory intent, argues Professor Selmi,
does not revolve around a search for a particular conscious state of mind. Rather,
it entails a search for causation.2°
In a similar vein, Professor Kagan, who asserts that the Court's First
Amendment doctrine in fact is aimed at determining whether a challenged law is the
product of an improper government motive, contends that the search for intent or
motive in these legislative decision making cases is best understood as an issue of
but-for causation. 5 Rather than searching for the state of mind of any particular
person, or even of the decision making body itself, a court is, and properly should
be, looking for the influence, if any, of a particular factor in the decision-making
process.2° Moreover, Professor Kagan suggests, a court makes that determination
through an examination of circumstantial evidence indicating that the protected
factor caused a particular decision to be made.20 7
This approach may readily be carried over into the statutory employment
discrimination context.20 ' Employment decisions, like legislative acts, often are the
product of group decision making. A search for the conscious bias or intent of
group members is as unproductive and meaningless in the employment context as
it is in the legislative context. Instead, the record should be considered as a whole
to determine whether plaintiff's group status played a role, or was the but-for cause,
of the decision at issue.209
The academic setting, which has produced its share of employment
discrimination cases, provides a useful model for examining horizontal group
decision making.210 In Curley v. St. John's University,2" for example, the plaintiff
contended he had been denied the opportunity to teach graduate courses because of
203. Selmi, supra note 22, at 304.
204. Id. at 289. Professor Selmi criticizes the Court, however, as too often unwilling to infer
discrimination from circumstantial evidence. Id. at 334-35.
205. Kagan, supra note 197, at 439.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 442-43. Professor Kagan argues the rules the Court has developed for analyzing First
Amendment claims, much like the presumptions and burdens of proof developed in the employment
arena, are aimed at "flush[ing] out bad motives." Id. at 443.
208. Selmi, supra note 22, at 301-02.
209. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text for a discussion of the different causation
models applicable in the employment discrimination context.
210. West, supra note 6, at 125-26 (noting that academic settings usually involve decision making
by multiple committees, and that such a system "does not easily fit under the Title VII theory or
structure").
211. 19 F. Supp.2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
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his age. The recommendation that plaintiff be restricted to undergraduate teaching
had been made by a Peer Review Committee, which recommendation the Dean had
accepted.212 Pointing to discriminatory statements made by one of the committee
members,1 3 plaintiff alleged that the committee's recommendation was motivated
at least in part by age, and he sought to hold the university liable under the
ADEA.1 4 The university moved for summaryjudgment, arguing that the comments
of a faculty peer were an insufficient basis for imputing wrongful motive to the
university when the dean made the "final decision. ' 2 5 The trial court denied the
university's motion. That other group members, and the Dean, may have acted for
reasons unrelated to age did not of itself relieve the university of liability. As the
court noted: "A plaintiff need not prove every one of the decision-makers biased
in order to argue that the discriminatory motives of some of the decision-makers
rendered the decision discriminatory. '216 If plaintiff could show that his age was a
motivating factor in the decision to deny him graduate courses, he would be entitled
to a verdict in his favor.
But providing such proof has been difficult for plaintiffs in settings where
collective decision making is the rule.21 7 In Fisher v. Vassar College, for example,
the court, while recognizing that a group decision making process should not
insulate a university from liability, found insufficient evidence that plaintiff's sex
had motivated her denial of tenure.1 8 The court reversed a verdict in favor of the
plaintiff despite evidence calling into question the nondiscriminatory reasons
articulated by the university. "Because there are numerous participants in the
decision-making process, each potentially.having individual reasons for rejecting
a plaintiff, there is a greater likelihood that some of those reasons will differ from
the reason officially given by the institution," said the court in discounting the
plaintiff's evidence. 2 "9 Thus, despite its recognition that an employer should not be
able to insulate its discriminatory decisions by using a group decision making
process, the Fisher court in fact made it more difficult for plaintiffs to prevail in
212. Id. at 184.
213. Plaintiff alleged that one of the committee members, Dr. Giuseppe, asked him why he would
want to stay around after he had turned 60 and commented that "when you hit the big 60 you are over
the hill." Id. at 185.
214. Id. at 183.
215. Id. at 183.
216. Id. at 192.
217. Namenwirth v. Board of Regents of U. of Wis. System, 769 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir. 1985)
(discussing the difficulty ofeliminating discrimination in tenure cases). In Namenwirth, despite the fact
that the plaintiff was the first woman hired in a tenure track position in her department in thirty-five
years and the first person denied tenure by her department, the court found insufficient evidence that
sex motivated the decision. See West, supra note 6, at 127 (describing the difficulties female plaintiffs
in academic settings have faced, in large part because of the committee structure of decision making,
and stating: "These academic cases indicate how difficult it is for a plaintiff to attribute the prejudice
shown by the remarks of one member of a decision-making committee to the decision of the committee
as a whole, or to the eventual adverse action against the plaintiff.").
218. 114 F.3d 1332 (2d Cir. 1997).
219. Id. at 1338.
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such cases.
The search for discriminatory intent in these group decision making cases,
however, should proceed as it would in cases involving a single decision maker or a
vertical decision making process. The court should ask whether there is a causal chain
between the protected characteristic and the challenged decision and whether the
events that comprise that chain are attributable to the employer.
The plaintiff's prima facie case, treatment of those similarly situated, procedural
irregularities, and evidence calling into question the defendant's proffered justification
for its decision, all may usefully be analyzed in determining whether the protected
characteristic played a causal role." 0 Discriminatory statements by one or more group
members, whether or not those statements were made during the group's deliberative
process, also provide circumstantial evidence that the plaintiff's race, sex, national
origin or age was a motivating factor in the group's decision.
However, unless courts bring to the task of drawing inferences from
circumstantial evidence a realistic understanding of group decision making dynamics,
no legal standard, whether framed in terms of causation or in terms of discriminatory
intent, will yield sound results. Unfortunately, this sort of realistic understanding is
too often absent from decisions involving horizontal decision making groups.
For example, it would be a mistake for courts to assume that members of a
decision making group will object to or block decisions they consider wrongfully
motivated where those decisions are favored by powerful group members. Although
a thorough review of the literature on compliance with authority is beyond the scope
of this project, numerous psychological studies have confirmed people's tendency,
given certain conditions, to comply with authority and to engage in conduct that they
would otherwise consider morally wrong. Perhaps the most famous (or infamous) are
the Milgram experiments conducted in the 1960s." In that study, subjects were
willing to administer what they believed to be painful or even deadly shocks to other
persons when directed to do so by the experimenter.' Milgram's study, among other
things, vividly illustrates how difficult it is for people to break out of highly scripted
interactions dominated by a person in apparent authority, even when they are being
called upon to engage in conduct they would surely find abhorrent.
While not as dramatic as the Milgram experiments, numerous other studies
aptly illustrate the fallacy of assuming that individual members of a decision making
group will buck group norms and speak their minds. For example, during the
220. See Simon, supra note 22, at 1097-1101 (advising courts to look for same forms of
circumstantial evidence of group's motives as would be considered in cases involving individual
decision maker).
221. Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority (1974).
222. As the shock levels and the learner's protests increased, subjects began questioning the
experimenter. However, the experimenter, no matter what the subject's question or complaint, was
instructed to give one of a small, set number of stock responses, including "Please continue," "The
experiment requires that you continue," "It is absolutely essential that you continue," or "You have no
other choice, you must go on." The results were stunning. Sixty-two percent of subjects administered
shocks all the way up to 450 volts, even after the "learner" had screamed in pain one final time and
fallen silent 120 volts earlier. Id.
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1950s, Solomon Asch conducted a study demonstrating that people's reports about
their own visual perceptions (if not the perceptions themselves) can be profoundly
influenced by the behavior of other members in an ad hoc group. 23 Asch's group
conformity study extended an earlier finding by Muzafir Sharif that group norms
could influence not only how people describe their perceptions, but also what
people in fact perceive.224
Both Asch's and Sherif's studies were performed using ad hoc groups, in
which group members had no real power to determine subjects' future outcomes in
any way. Even in these situations, people have a strong tendency to respond to
subtle signals embedded in social interactions, and to bring their behavior into
conformity with the norms those signals suggest are operating within the group. As
this and subsequent work in organizational behavior demonstrates, group norms can
powerfully shape members' perceptions of objective and subjective phenomena,
their notions of acceptable procedures and patterns of discourse, their prioritization
of differing goals, and the interpretive "frames" they bring to the decision making
process.225
It is reasonable to assume that both compliance with authority and group
conformity effects operate even more powerfully in the workplace, where being
perceived as a "team player" is often essential to one's economic survival. Within
organizations, working groups rapidly develop a set of norms, which shape the
conditions of interaction between group members and powerfully influence the
direction of group decision making.226 Group norm compliance effects interact with
223. S.E. Asch, Effects of Group Pressure Upon the Modification and Distortion on Judgments,
in Groups, Leadership, and Men: Research in Human Relations 177 (Harold Guetzkow, ed., 1951).
Asch asked subjects to participate in a study, ostensibly with six other subjects, of visual perception.
The other six subjects were in fact confederates working with the experimenter. Subjects were shown
a series of two posters. In each case, one poster had a single line on it, while the other poster bore three
lines of varying lengths. The single line on the one poster was always quite obviously the same size as
one of the three lines on the other.
The "subjects," first five of the confederates and then the real subject, were asked to state which of
the lines on a three-line poster was the same size as the line on the corresponding one-line poster.
Sometimes, they gave the obviously correct answer, but, as the experiment progressed, all six
confederates began giving the wrong answers, always with the same ease and assurance as they had
while giving correct answers.
In the face of five incorrect answers, 80 percent of subjects went along with the five confederates in
at least one trial. In the aggregate, subjects went along with the group and gave incorrect responses
approximately 30 percent of the time, despite the obviousness of the correct response. For a subsequent
description and explication of these studies, see Solomon E. Asch, Opinions and Social Pressure, Sci.
Am., Nov. 1955, at 31-35.
224. Sherif's "autokinetic effect" studies are described in Muzafir Sherif, The Psychology of
Social Norms 89-112 (1936).
225. See Clayton P. Alderfer,An Intergroup Perspective on Group Dynamics, in Classic Readings
in Organizational Behavior, 140, 142 (J. Steven Ott, ed., 1996) (discussing effect of group norms on
cognitive formations).
226. See generally, Robert R. Blake, et al., Foundations and Dynamics of intergroup Behavior,
in Classic Readings in Organizational Behavior, 121, 122-23 (J. Steven Ott, ed., 1996) (discussing
emergence of group norms in organizational subgroups).
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emerging patterns of authority and influence in a working group.2 7 As these
patterns develop, higher status brings with it a right to dissent or diverge from group
norms, whereas lower status members, even if their own views diverge from an
apparent group consensus, are more likely to engage in what is known as "expedient
conformity."2 "
If courts are to draw reasonable inferences from circumstantial evidence in
group decision making cases, they must become far more sophisticated about the
dynamics of group process. Such sophistication would prevent courts from
assuming, for example, that if minority group members are included within the
decision making group, their presence is an assurance that discrimination is unlikely
to have occurred.2 9 At the same time, courts must build a doctrinal framework
capable of guiding the factual inquiry in a sensible way, which, combined with
accurate models of group decision process, will yield sound outcomes in specific
cases. In our view, the first step in building such a framework is to acknowledge
that in these and other disparate treatment cases, the court's inquiry should center
on two questions: is there an unbroken causal chain between the plaintiff's group
status and the challenged decision, and are the actions that comprise that chain
attributable to the employer?
In determining whether a causal link exists, the Reeves court has recognized
that evidence discrediting the reason articulated by an employer can indicate that
an unlawful motive was operating. 0 Such evidence should not be discounted, as
the Fisher court did, simply because the decision is the product of group decision
making. Rather than attempting to ascertain the motives of each group member,
the court instead should assess the circumstantial evidence as a whole to
determine whether there is sufficient evidence that the plaintiffs race, sex, or
other protected characteristic actuated the decision.' A prima facie case,
coupled with evidence calling into question the truthfulness of the proffered
reason, generally should be sufficient to support a verdict in the plaintiff's favor,
whatever form the decision making process assumed. 2
227. See generally, Robert R. Blake, et al., Foundations and Dynamics of Intergroup Behavior,
in Classic Readings in Organizational Behavior, supra note 225, at 122-33 (discussing the development
of status and power allocation in intra-organizational subgroups).
228. James L. Bowditch & Anthony Buono, A Primer on Organizational Behavior 153 (defining
"expedient conformity" as a situation in which a group member expresses attitudes or engages in
behaviors that conform to group norms despite holding private beliefs that are at odds with group
sentiment).
229. See, e.g., St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 508 n.2, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2748
n.2 (1993) (describing district court's finding that race unlikely to have motivated decision because two
members of the decision-making group were black.).
230. 530 U.S. 133, 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2108 (2000).
231. For example, in Namenwirth v. Board of Regents of U of Wis. System, 769 F.2d 1235 (7th
Cir. 1985), the dissenting judge chastised the majority for appearing to insist on conscious bias on the
part of a university committee in a tenure denial case. Instead, the dissent asserted, the court should
have examined all of the circumstances, including the fact that the plaintiffwas the first woman hired
in her tenure track position in her department, and the first person denied tenure, in 35 years, in
deciding whether plaintiff's sex was a likely explanation for the challenged decision.
232. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 154,120 S. Ct. at2112 (Ginsberg, J., concurring). See McGinley, supra
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In many group decision making situations, however, as exemplified by those arising
in Curley and Fisher, the group may be composed of co-workers, not supervisors.
Generally, an employer is not vicariously liable for the actions of an employee's co-
workers, as they are not agents of the employer." In these group decision making cases,
even though a causal link exists, may an employer avoid liability when no supervisory
employee has acted because of a protected characteristic?
The answer, again looking to the reasoning of Ellerth, is no. Although group
members may be peers or co-workers of the plaintiff, and generally would not be
considered agents of the employer,' when the employer has delegated decision making
authority to the peer group, they become agents for purposes ofthe particular decision."
When the employer has empowered the co-workers to take a tangible employment
action, the employer is vicariously liable for the action, because absent that delegation
of authority to the group, the injury could not have been inflicted by the group. "[O]nly
a supervisor, or other person acting with the authority of the company, can cause this
sort of injury.""23 As noted by the trial court in Curley v. St. John's University, even if
group members are peers, "they are peers with power to affect the terms and conditions
of Dr. Curley's employment in material adverse ways." ' But for the university's
decision to place the power to make the decisions in the hands of a university committee,
the group would have had no means to deprive Dr. Curley of his graduate teaching
status. Thus, just as in a single or vertical decision maker setting, the employer will be
vicariously liable for actions it has empowered its agents to take."3
IV. CONCLUSION
The search for a discriminatory motive in disparate treatment cases often is
envisioned as an attempt to determine whether a supervisor, despite his denials,
note 22, at 485 (advocating advising juries that a prima facie case, coupled with proof of prextext, "can
raise an inference that the employer, in evaluating the employee, was either consciously or
unconsciously influenced by the employee's race, gender or national origin.").
233. The Ellerth Court rejected the argument that the workplace setting, which provides workers
with proximity to each other, is itself a sufficient basis for imposing vicarious liability on the employer
for workplace wrongs, whether committed by co-workers or supervisors. "The aided in the agency
relation standard, therefore, requires the existence of something more than the employment relation
itself." Burlington Indust., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 760, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2268 (1998).
234. Id.
235. It is the delegation of this authority, the empowerment by the company to inflict this sort of
harm, that renders the employer vicariously liable for the agent's action, under the "aided in the agency
relation" standard. Id. at 763, 118 S. Ct. at 2269.
236. Id. at 762, 118 S. Ct. at 2269 (emphasis added).
237. 19 F. Supp.2d 181,192 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). The Court considered the decision to preclude Dr.
Curley from teaching graduate classes to be a "materially adverse" action. Whether a tangible
employment action must be materially adverse is debatable. See White, supra note 156, at 1154-60.
However, a materially adverse action undeniably is a tangible employment action within the meaning
of Ellerth. 524 U.S. at 761, 118 S. Ct. at 2268.
238. "If an employer entrusts personnel decisions to persons who act on the basis of impermissible
motives, the employer is responsible for the resulting act of discrimination." Fisher v. Vassar College,
114 F.3d 1332, 1371(2d Cir. 1997) (Newman, J., dissenting).
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consciously acted out of bias, animus or on the basis of "inaccurate and stigmatizing
stereotypes" in making an employment decision. Framing the search for discriminatory
motive is this way, however, cannot prove fully effective in eliminating discrimination,
as individuals may be unaware of their own biases or the influences those biases have
had on their own decision making.
The reality of decision making in the employment area, moreover, is that multiple
individuals are often involved in making employment decisions affecting an employee.
Just as an individual may be unaware of his own biases, so too, the ultimate decision
maker or members of a decision making group may be unaware that others involved in
the decision making process have based their decisions, in whole or in part, on an
employee's race, sex or other protected characteristic. Importantly, that unawareness
generally has not been considered a sufficient basis for depriving a plaintiff of her
discrimination claim in these multiple actor cases. This is so because courts have
recognized that impermissible considerations of protected group status in one part ofthe
decision-making chain may cause a job action to occur, even though other participants
were unaware that protected status had played a role in the process.
This causation based inquiry in multiple actor cases usefully informs how
discriminatory intent or motive is best understood in any decision making context In
cases involving a single decision maker, as in those involving multiple decision makers,
the question should not be whether a conscious use of race, sex or age has been injected
into the decision making process. Instead, it should simply be whether the employee's
race, sex, or other protected characteristic has played a causal role in the decision making
process. If so, then a disparate treatment claim should exist, so long as that causal link
may be attributed to the employer, directly or vicariously. Understanding the interplay
and importance of both causation and vicarious liability provides a meaningful way of
thinking about the intent requirement in disparate treatment claims, whether in the
individual or multiple actor context
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